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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Dallas Morning News and the Texas Observer broke the
story of a sex abuse scandal at the remote West Texas State School in
Pyote, Texas.' The news stories revealed that officials had ignored com-
plaints of sexual abuse of juvenile detainees for at least two years, even
after a Texas Ranger's investigation substantiated the charges.2 The alle-
gations included charges that inmates of the Texas Youth Commission
(TYC), as young as eleven years-old, were sexually abused by detention
supervisors.' Responding to public outcry, the Texas State Legislature
passed Senate Bill 103, aimed at reforming the TYC,4 the state agency
responsible for juvenile corrections.' One provision of the bill lowered
1. Doug J. Swanson, Sex Abuse Reported at Youth Jail: Complaints About Staffers Ig-
nored, Covered Up, Investigation Reveals, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 18, 2007, availa-
ble at 2007 WLNR 3240905; Nate Blakeslee, Hidden in Plain Sight, TEx. OBSERVER, Feb.
23, 2007, at 6, available at 2007 WLNR 5413044.
2. Doug J. Swanson, Sex Abuse Reported at Youth Jail: Complaints About Staffers Ig-
nored, Covered Up, Investigation Reveals, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 18, 2007, availa-
ble at 2007 WLNR 3240905.
3. Alex Branch, Audit Cites Texas Youth Commission Improvements, FORT WORrH
STAR-TIlELEGRAM, May 6, 2009, at B2, available at 2009 WLNR 8554749 (describing 2007
Texas legislative actions after the sexual abuse scandal was revealed). While TYC has
failed to comply with directives to hire more certified sex offender counselors, the commis-
sion has improved its processing of mistreatment allegations. Id. A spokesperson for TYC
explained that, due to the shortage of sex offender counselors in Texas, the positions are
hard to fill. Id. TYC is training its own employees to earn the necessary certification and
fill these vacancies. Id. The agency has implemented most of the forty-seven recommen-
dations suggested by auditors in 2007. Id.
4. Act of June 8, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 263, § 53, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 449 (current
version at TEx. Hum. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.084(e) (West Supp. 2010)).
5. Mission Statement and Guiding Principles, TEX. YOUTH COMM'N http://
www.tyc.state.tx.us/about/mission.html (last updated Feb. 22, 2010) (outlining the mission
of the TYC, which includes "promot[ing] public safety by operating juvenile correctional
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the age limit for TYC inmates from twenty-one to nineteen.6 Conse-
quently, once a juvenile reaches the age of nineteen, the minor can no
longer be held in a TYC juvenile detention facility, and must be dis-
charged either through release or transfer to the Texas Department of
Corrections.' The rationale behind the lowered age limit was reducing
the number of juveniles being held at TYC facilities;' however, according
to juvenile justice advocates, the reduced age limitation is responsible for
the recent rise in Texas juveniles certified to be tried and sentenced as
adults.9 Significantly, the transfer rate in Texas has risen by 22% in the
last two years.o As a result of the lowered age limit, prosecutors who
believe there is an inadequate amount of time to work with young offend-
ers within the juvenile justice system seek certification more often.1
Should Texans be alarmed by the jump in the number of juveniles who
are standing trial as adults? I answer that question in this Comment with
a resounding "yes." Transfer, sometimes called "certification" or
"waiver," is not only detrimental to the minor, who is treated by the legal
system as an adult, but is also harmful to society as a whole.12 Youths
facilities and by partnering with youth, families, and communities to provide a safe and
secure environment.").
6. Act of June 8, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 263, § 53, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 449 (current
version at TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.084(e) (West Supp. 2010)).
7. TEX. Hum. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.084(e) (West Supp. 2010).
8. House Comm. on Corrections, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 103, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007)
(indicating two methods for lowering the number of young people committed to the TYC:
lowering the age limit from twenty-one to nineteen and prohibiting youth who commit
misdemeanors from being held at TYC facilities).
9. Lisa Sandberg, More Juvenile Offenders Landing in Actual Prison, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRIss-NEws, Feb. 23, 2009, at 13A, available at 2009 WLNR 3502417 (discussing the rise
in the number of juvenile offenders who are certified to stand trial in adult criminal court).
Juvenile justice advocates believe adult prison settings cannot meet the needs of young
offenders. Id.
10. Id. (providing state-wide and county-specific transfer rates). In 2008, Bexar
County experienced a 75% jump in the number of youth certified from the previous year.
Id. Tarrant County certified almost triple the number of youths in 2008 as it did in 2007.
Id.
11. Id. (explaining why transfer rates are increasing). Describing the mentality of
prosecutors, Bexar County Chief Juvenile Prosecutor Jill Mata characterizes the age limita-
tion as leaving prosecutors "with no option but to certify [young offenders] as adults." Id.;
House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009) (acknowledging
that since the passage of Senate Bill 103 in 2007, "[p]rosecutors now tend to seek to certify
some 16- and 17-year-old offenders as adult offenders because the lowered age cap for
TYC allows detention in juvenile facilities only for two or three years.").
12. Helen M. Alvare, A Common Theme, 22 NO-rRE DAME J.L. E-nucs & Pun. Po.'Y
1, 5 (2008) (discussing a November 2007 survey by the Centers for Disease Control that
found treating young offenders like adults at both trial and sentencing phases appears to be
more detrimental to juveniles and society than the practice of treating young offenders
within the juvenile justice system). Specifically, the survey found that the overall effect of
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who are incarcerated with adults are more likely to be physically and sex-
ually victimized, more likely to commit suicide, and more likely to re-
offend upon their release than are youths who serve time for similar
crimes in juvenile detention facilities.' 3 Juveniles incarcerated with adults
cannot avail themselves of the therapeutic, rehabilitative, and educational
opportunities that exist in the juvenile system.14 During critical stages of
identity development, juveniles locked up with adults form distorted
views of their identities and tend to feel rejected by society, learning anti-
social behaviors from the inmates around them." Furthermore, juveniles
emerging from adult prisons must deal with the stigma of a felony convic-
tion, which often precludes them from obtaining educational loans and
meaningful jobs.' 6
Successful rehabilitation of youth within the juvenile justice system is
possible. This is true even for youth who commit serious crimes.17 Texas
is the home of the Capital Offender Program (COP), described by the
Office of Juvenile Justice Prevention and Delinquency as a "model pro-
gram" for its success in reducing recidivism for youth who complete the
five-month program." While COP handles a relatively small number of
transferring young offenders to the adult system was an increase in the violence rates
among those juveniles. Id.
13. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH- JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCAR-
CERATING YOUTH IN Aruur JAILS IN AMERICA 4, 10 (2007), http://www.campaign4youth
justice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing_JuvenilesReport_2007-11-
15.pdf.
14. See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENIL ES: TIlE DANGERS OF IN-
CARCERATING YOUTIH IN ADur JAILS IN AMERICA 4 (2007), http://www.campaign4youth
justice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-JailingJuvenilesReport_2007-11-
15.pdf (noting that adult jails do not provide the necessary educational and programming
services that are essential to a young person's healthy development); MAcARTHUR FOUN-
DATION, RESEARCH NETWMORK ON ADOIESCENT DEvELOPMENT AND JuVENIIte JUSTICE,
ISSUE BRIEF 5: TiHE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICI: TRANSFER OF ADoi s-
CENTS TO TIE ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/3582is-
sue brief 5.pdf (outlining the reasons why significant differences exist for youths held in
juvenile correctional facilities and youths held in adult prisons). Despite the legal require-
ments for jails to provide education to youth, few jails comply. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH
JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENIiE-s: TIlE DANGERS OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN Acur JAILS
IN AME RICA 4 (2007), http://www.campaign4youthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReports
Articles/CFYJ-Jailing-JuvenilesReport_2007-11-15.pdf.
15. Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult
Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 184
(2007).
16. Id.
17. TEx. YOuTm COMM'N, SPECIALIZIED CORRECfIONAL TREATMENT (2007), http://
www.tyc.state.tx.us/programs/special-treat.html#capital.
18. MiciiEi' DEifCii ET AL., THlE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AusTIN, LYNDON B. JoHNsON
SCII. O' Pun. AFFAIRs, FROM TIME Our o HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE
AjutT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SysTEM 66 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/
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juveniles each year," the success of the program illustrates that rehabili-
tating delinquent youth through state-funded programs is not simply an
idealistic hope-it is a genuine reality. Young people are more malleable
and susceptible to intervention, therapy, and treatment than adults.20 In-
deed, this notion is the principle upon which the juvenile justice system
was founded. 2 ' Texas would best serve its own interests if, instead of al-
lowing more juveniles to move into adult court, money was allocated to
expand exemplary programs such as COP and youth were kept within the
juvenile justice system.
I offer three straightforward reforms to Texas law that aim to reduce
transfer levels and ensure that when a juvenile is transferred to adult
court, the justice system has operated fairly. First, the 2007 change lower-
ing the age limitation for youth incarcerated by the Texas Youth Commis-
sion must be reversed, and youths must instead remain under the
jurisdiction of the TYC until they reach twenty-one years of age. This
change will lead to decreased transfer rates because prosecutors will seek
From %20Time%200ut%20to%2OHard%2OTime-revised %20final.pdf (describing the
Giddings State School, run by the Texas Youth Commission). COP began in 1988 as a
treatment program for youths who were incarcerated for homicide. Id. The Texas Youth
Commission's website provides the following information on the Capital and Serious Vio-
lent Offender Program:
The Giddings State School operates a Capital and Serious Violent Offender Treat-
ment Program for youths that are committed for murder, capital murder, and if the
offense involved the use of a weapon or deadly force. The program helps these young
people connect feelings associated with their violent behavior and to indentify alterna-
tive ways to respond when faced with risky situations in the future. Participants in this
program are required to reenact their crimes and to play the role of both perpetrator
and victim.
The Giddings Capital and Serious Violent Offender Program has gained worldwide
attention and been featured on several national news programs. It is one of TYC's
most promising specialized treatment programs. Research shows that participation in
this program reduced the likelihood of being re-incarcerated for any offense by 55
percent, and for a felony offence, by 43 percent.
Specialized Correctional Treatment, Tr~x. YouTni COMM'N, http://www.tyc.state.tx.us/pro-
grams/special]treat.html#capital (last updated Sept. 14. 2007).
19. MicinuTE D13rrcii ET AL., TilE UNIV. OiF TEx. AT AusTIN, LYNDON B. JoHNsoN
SCIH. OF1 Pun. AFFAIRs, FRom TIME Our To HARDI TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE
ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 66 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/
From%20Time%200ut%20to%20Hard%20Time-revised %20final.pdf (noting "[tihe pro-
gram takes up to five months to complete" and "[o]nly eight or nine youth are enrolled in
the program at a time").
20. Adam Caine Ortiz, Juvenile Death Penalty: Is It "Cruel and Unusual" in Light of
Contemporary Standards?, 17 CRIM. JUsTr. 21, 21 (2003) (asserting the common sense no-
tion that of all people who commit crimes, juveniles are the "most amenable to treatment
and rehabilitation").
21. Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Special Issues of Juvenile Justice: An Introduction, 15-SPG.
CRIM. Jusr. 4, 4 (2000).
2010] 321
THE SCHOLAR
transfer less often when more time is allotted for TYC to work with a
young person. 2 2 Second, judges must be required to make individual
findings for a juvenile during a transfer hearing, and a judge must be re-
quired to write out all of these findings without the aid of a pre-printed
form. Texas law is already written in such a way as to suggest meaningful
and individualized consideration is required during certification hear-
ings,23 but actual practice reveals some courts use pre-printed check-box
forms, and judges sign off on transfer decisions without fully considering
the circumstances of each young offender.24 Finally, a juvenile must be
able to file an interlocutory appeal immediately after a transfer hearing,
before adult criminal trial. Prior to 1995, an appeal following a transfer
hearing was allowable, but the law changed as Texas moved to "get
tough" on juvenile crime. 25 Allowing an immediate interlocutory appeal
will support evenhandedness in the transfer process. These changes are
in line with the recent trend in juvenile law in Texas. The Texas legisla-
ture expressed its desire to make the transfer process "as fair as possible"
by the passage of a 2009 law allowing defense attorneys five days instead
of one day to inspect the evidence that will be used at a juvenile's certifi-
cation hearing.2 6 The reforms I suggest will further the goal of fairness in
the transfer process.
22. House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
23. TiEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f) (West Supp. 2010) (listing the four factors that ajudge is required to consider during a transfer hearing). The factors are:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in
favor of transfer given to offenses against the person; (2) the sophistication and matur-
ity of the child; (3) the record and previous history of the child; and (4) the prospects
of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the
child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile
court.
Id.
24. Chris Vogel, For Their Own Good, HousToN PiEss, May 28, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 10693190 (providing an extensive overview of the problems resulting from
certifying teens as adults in Texas, including the inability to appeal after a certification
hearing until after the criminal trial, the lack of individual findings required by judges
during a certification hearing, and in Harris County, the policy of holding certified
juveniles in solitary confinement twenty-three hours a day in adult jail for their "own
safety").
25. See House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 327, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995)
("[R]evis[ing] the juvenile justice system to expand the offenses that can be punished by a
determinate ... sentence, lower the age at which juveniles can be tried as adults, establish a
statewide juvenile records system and establish guidelines for a progressive sanctions
model for juvenile offenses.").
26. Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S.
(2009) ("Because of the reduction in age, prosecutors may seek more adult certifications,
particularly with 16-year-old or 17-year-old offenders").
322 [Vol. 13:317
LIMITING JUVENILE TRANSFERS
Although the juvenile system is far from perfect, the adult criminal jus-
tice system is astoundingly worse for juveniles who commit crimes.27 A
common theme in this Comment is that the underlying principles upon
which the juvenile justice system was founded remain viable and worthy
goals, and Texas law should reflect that understanding.
Part II traces the development of juvenile justice in this country, in-
cluding the evolution of the first American juvenile courts, and summa-
rizes the due process rights afforded to juveniles by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
In Part III, I argue juvenile transfers to adult court should be limited in
Texas by highlighting the scientific, sociological, and psychological re-
search that exists on adolescents, with a special emphasis on young peo-
ples' development, decision-making and reasoning abilities, and the
resulting insights the research provides into the process of judging
juveniles' culpability. Part III also addresses the Supreme Court case of
Roper v. Simmons.2 8 The reasoning in Roper lends support to the con-
tention that juveniles should be treated separately from adults.2 9
Part IV contains three specific reforms to Texas law that will signifi-
cantly improve the delivery of fundamental elements of juvenile justice:
individual consideration, rehabilitation, and treatment. I argue for the
need for written, individualized findings during transfer hearings, the im-
portance of the opportunity for immediate appeal of a certification order,
and a reversal of the 2007 amendment lowering the age limit for TYC
inmates from twenty-one to nineteen.
This Comment concludes with the assertion that transferring juveniles
to adult court is only appropriate in rare and exceptional situations.
Texas must revisit the idea of juvenile transfer and financially prioritize
rehabilitation for youths. The policy of treating juveniles like adults fails
both the juvenile and the public.
27. RANDALL G. S-IELDEN, DELINOUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN So-
CIETY 344 (2006) (outlining the increased victimization rates among juveniles imprisoned
in adult facilities and the increased "social costs" of locking away youth with adults).
28. 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (ruling that the imposition of the death penalty for a
person who committed the offenses before the age of eighteen constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment).
29. Helen M. Alvare, Symposium on Youth and the Law: Foreword: A Common
Theme, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. Enrics & PuB. Poi'Y 1, 4 (2008) (asserting that the reason-
ing in Roper provides strong persuasive force that juveniles should receive mitigated
sentences due to their youth).
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II. FROM PARENS PATRIAE TO "DO AN ADULT CRIME, Do ADULT
TIME": THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE
A. Emerging Justice
Understanding the modern juvenile court system requires a look back
at the origins and development of juvenile justice law in the United
States. By the end of the fourteenth century, the English common law
started recognizing infancy and immaturity as viable defenses to criminal
acts.30 Children younger than seven were immune from criminal sanc-
tions.3 1 With few exceptions, laws in the colonial United States paralleled
the English common law.3 2
The doctrine of parens patriae largely influenced American juvenile
justice in the United States from the late nineteenth century through the
middle part of the twentieth century. 3 In medieval England, parens pa-
triae was a form of property law allowing the king to oversee the estates
of landed orphans.34 As "father" of the country, the king assumed the
role of legal caretaker of "his" people, particularly those unable to care
for themselves.3 5 In the modern context, parens patriae, "parent of [the]
country,"36 encompasses the idea that youths are not capable of criminal
30. DAVID L. MyiRs, ExciLUING VIOLuNT Younis FROM JUVENIL CouRTr: TII
EFFEClVENESS oF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 12 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams III,
eds., 2001) (tracing the law's treatment of children from English common law to the early
American colonial period).
31. Id. (describing the common law rules for children who committed crimes).
32. Id. (acknowledging that common law principles influenced how early American
law viewed the legal responsibility of children). In colonial America, a rebuttable pre-
sumption existed that children between seven and fourteen years of age lacked any crimi-
nal capacity, and infancy and immaturity were not allowable defenses for any child over
the age of fourteen because the law viewed those children as adults. Id.; Elizabeth S. Scott
& Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REv. 799, 804 (2003) (tracing the history
of the treatment of children under the law).
33. Akira Morita, Juvenile Justice in Japan: A Historical and Cross-Cultural Perspec-
tive, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JusiCiE 360, 360 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds.,
2002) (noting that Japanese juvenile law borrowed and selectively assimilated the concept
of parens patriae from the United States). Morita claims the rehabilitative ideals of early
American juvenile courts strongly influenced Japanese juvenile law, but over time, the two
systems evolved in opposite directions. Id. at 360-61. The trend in the United States
moved toward accountability and punishment, while Japan continued to stress rehabilita-
tion and protection. Id. at 361.
34. RANDALL G. SIIELDEN, DEINOUENCY AND JUVENILUI JUSTICE IN AMERICAN So-
CIETY 18 (2006) (tracing the roots of the concept of parens patriae to the chancery courts of
medieval England).
35. Id. (describing the role of the King of England as the guardian of orphaned
children).
36. BLACK's LAw DIcIoNARy 1144 (8th ed. 2004). Parens patriae is defined as "[a]
doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen,
[especially] on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit." Id.
[Vol. 13:317324
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intent; thus, the government must provide them with protection, gui-
dance, and rehabilitation. Under this principle, the state stands as a
"substitute parent" for children who have engaged in unlawful conduct.
Put another way, parens patriae is the idea that in handling young offend-
ers, the state should focus not on punishment, but rather employ protec-
tive measures to ensure the child is rehabilitated."
At the end of the nineteenth century, a series of reform movements
arose in reaction to the massive social change in the United States result-
ing from widespread industrialization, immigration, and urbanization."0
Juvenile courts came into existence during a time when the existing
American "values and institutions seemed incapable of supporting a new
developing social structure."4 1 In the mid-1820s, reformers began creat-
ing houses of refuge for children,42 now viewed as precursors to the de-
velopment of a distinct juvenile justice system in the United States. 3
Houses of refuge exclusively held children, most of whom were not com-
mitted for criminal offenses."" The houses of refuge are alternatively de-
scribed by scholars as "poorhouses," with the goal of preventing children
37. M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDU-
ALIZED JUSTICE 1-2 (1982) (summarizing the goals of traditional juvenile justice philoso-
phies in the United States).
38. Id. at 4 (1982) (describing the motivations of the reformers who promoted the first
juvenile courts). Reformers recognized the societal concern with delinquent children; the
concept of parens patriae as applied to juvenile justice created an avenue for far-reaching
involvement in troubled children's lives. Id.
39. Akira Morita, Juvenile Justice in Japan: A Historical and Cross-Cultural Perspec-
tive, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JusTIcE, 360, 361 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds.,
2002).
40. M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: TilE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDU-
ALUZE113 JUSTIcL 2 (1982) (providing an explanation for the origins of juvenile courts and a
snapshot into the late nineteenth century social state of the United States).
41. Id. (describing one of the new social problems as "youthful misbehavior").
42. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution ofJuvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Cen-
tury: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
42, 46 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (outlining the link between the houses of
refuge and the reformers of the late nineteenth century). The two major groups of reform-
ers during this time were the Progressives and the Jacksonians. Id. The Jacksonians
seemed to favor institutionalization of children in houses of refuge, which often amounted
to "nothing more 'than [] mini-prison[s] for children."' Id. While Progressive reformers
did not fully embrace the concept of houses of refuge, the Progressives did credit the Jack-
sonian reformers with "firmly establishing the principle that the state had a responsibility
toward its children (parens patriae) and its corollary that youthful offenders should be
housed separately from adult criminals." Id.
43. DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YoUTHs FROM JUVENIILE COURT: TillE
EFFECIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 12 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams III,
eds., 2001) (noting that the houses of refuge are frequently associated with the develop-
ment of the juvenile justice system).
44. Id.
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from turning into adult "paupers,"4 5 or as reform schools, akin to "mini-
prison[s]."4 6 Courts routinely placed juveniles who had committed no
criminal acts into houses of refuge without providing juveniles with due
process rights.4 7 Consequently, these placements raised constitutional
questions.48 The need for a "new legal mechanism" for juveniles became
clear as the nineteenth century drew to a close.4 9
In 1899, Chicago created the first juvenile court in the United States.5 0
The court was charged with hearing cases of "neglected, dependent, or
delinquent children under the age of 16.""' The new court allowed for
judicial discretion in choosing between punishment or individual treat-
ment and rehabilitation.52 The concept of a separate court for children
45. Id.
46. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution ofJuvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Cen-
tury: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
42, 46 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
47. DAvio L. MYERS, ExciLUDING VIouNT You-nis FRoM JUVENIUI F COUlfr: THE
EFFECflVENESS oiF LEGISLATIVE WAIVIR 12 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams III,
eds., 2001).
48. Id.
49. Id. (noting that the lack of due process that was associated with the houses of
refuge contributed to the belief that a new and separate system was needed for young
offenders).
50. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Cen-
tury: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENIUE, JUSHCE
42, 42 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (detailing the development of the first
juvenile courts and the individuals who led the movement). The "Act for the Treatment
and Control of Dependent, Neglected and Delinquent Children," passed the Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly on the final day of the legislative session, and formed the Cook County
Juvenile Court. Id. Lucy Flower and Julia Lathrop led the efforts to create this court, in
order to have children who had committed crimes heard in a separate court from adults.
Id. Flower and Lathrop were instrumental in helping the new court begin to operate by
raising money and assisting with the operation of a detention home. Id. at 50. Lucy
Flower, a philanthropist and reformer, suggested that the Chicago Woman's Club create a
new organization, named the Juvenile Court Committee (JCC), and charged it with manag-
ing a detention home and the compensating fifteen probation officers. Id. Once the JCC
was established in 1903, Julia Lathrop was chosen as the committee's first president. Id.
51. Micu-us DEfCH- ET AL., TIE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, LYNDON B. JOHNsoN
SCi. OF Pun. AFFAIRS, FROM TIME OUT To HARI) TIME: YOUNG CIHILDREN IN THE
ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SysTEM 5 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/
From %20Time%200ut%20to%2OHard%2OTime-revised%20final.pdf (providing a brief
history of juvenile justice in the United States from the nineteenth century to present).
52. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Cen-
tury: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENIUE JUSTICE
42, 42 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). Aside from individual treatment and
rehabilitation, the original juvenile court in Chicago was also based on the idea that judges,
considering individual children, could best decide whether a child's case should be heard in
juvenile or adult court. Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Special Issues ofJuvenile Justice: An Intro-
duction, 15-Seao. CRiM. Jus-I. 4, 4 (2000).
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quickly caught on, and by 1925, forty-six states had established juvenile
courts. Despite the widespread use of juvenile courts, America's early
juvenile justice system was characterized by a lack of uniformity, differing
age limits defining jurisdiction, varying rules of procedure, and discrepan-
cies in the types of children who were supervised by the courts.5 4 The
overarching justification and aim for the juvenile courts, however, was
generally agreed upon:55 to discover the root causes of the child's bad
behavior and intervene in such a way as to prevent the child from engag-
ing in more serious criminal activity in the future.5 6
The juvenile courts adopted an interventionist approach, reflected in
the way language was used to clarify the distinction between juvenile
court and criminal adult court.5 ' This distinction still exists today, and
the terminology used by each court reflects that separation.58 For exam-
ple, "adjudication" is the juvenile system's version of a trial in adult
court.59  Juveniles are not "convicted," they are "adjudicated delin-
quent."o Similarly, they are not found "guilty," but "in violation of the
53. DAviD L. MYERS, ExCLUDING VIoLENT Younis FROM JUVENILE COURT: TiHE.
EFECriVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 14 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams III,
eds., 2001) (explaining the emergence of the "rehabilitative ideal," and the manner in
which juvenile courts employed various strategies to positively influence young people's
behavior).
54. Id. (stating that in addition to a lack of uniformity, a relaxed approach existed
with regard to due process and procedural rules). The individuals who created the juvenile
court envisioned the court as a place where the child would be sheltered, hearings would
be closed, confidential records would be kept, and neither private attorneys nor juries
would participate in the legal process. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile
Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A
CENTURY OF1 JUVENILE JusTrIcE 42, 43 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
55. See DAVID L. MYERs, ExcLUDING VIOLENT Younis FROM JUVENILE COURT:
TH iE EFFECTlVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 14 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams
III, eds., 2001).
56. Id. (describing the theoretical underpinnings of early juvenile proceedings).
57. See id. (discussing the development of a "distinct language" for juvenile court
proceedings).
58. See RANDALL G. SHEonEN, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
SoCIEv'Y 334 (2006) (comparing proceedings in juvenile and adult courts); see also M.A.
BoRTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: TIHE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUS-
TICE 38 (1982) (outlining the two main proceedings in juvenile court: adjudication and
disposition, which are roughly equivalent to the guilt and sentencing stages in adult court).
59. RANDALL G. SHELDEN, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN So-
CIETY 334 (2006) (comparing the terms and procedures used in juvenile and adult courts).
Depending on the jurisdiction, the adjudication hearings can range from quite informal, to
as formal as an adult criminal trial. Id.
60. M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: TIlE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVII)U-
ALIZED JUSTICE 5 (1982) (exploring the theoretical distinctions that serve to separate the
juvenile system from the adult criminal justice system).
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juvenile code." 6' Accordingly, juveniles are considered "delinquent" in-
stead of "criminal." 6 2 The adjudicatory hearing is considered the fact-
finding portion of the juvenile process, while the dispositional hearing is
the rough equivalent to the sentencing phase in adult court.6 3 Juvenile
court is categorized as a civil-not a criminal-proceeding. 6 4
Juvenile courts operated without major constitutional challenges to
their approaches until the middle of the twentieth century.6 1 Critics of
the juvenile justice system began to voice opposition to the informal and
largely discretionary procedures used by juvenile courts during the 1950s
and 1960s, resulting in a variety of due process challenges eventually ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court during the "due process revolution." 66
B. The "Due Process Revolution"
In the 1966 case of Kent v. United States,6 1 the Supreme Court extended
several important due process rights to juveniles relating specifically to
the transfer process.6 8 The Court in Kent held a juvenile is entitled to a
61. Id.
62. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1967) (noting that the difference in the terminology
used in juvenile courts as compared with adult courts is touted as one of the significant
benefits of the unique juvenile system). Unfortunately, the difference in stigma between
"delinquent" and "criminal" is almost imperceptible. Id. at 23-24.
63. RANDALL G. SHELDEN, DiLINOUENCY AND JUVENI.LE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN So-
Cl ETY 334 (2006).
64. M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE CouRTr: TiHE TARNISHED lIDEAL OF INDIVIDU-
ALIZED JUSLIOCE 5 (1982) (analyzing the contributions of positivistic criminology and scien-
tific social work to the emergence of the juvenile justice system as a unique and separate
system).
65. DAVio L. MyriRs, EXCLUDING VioLENT Yournis FROM JuvENlIus CoulTe: TIHE
EFFEcriVENESS OF LiGISLATIVE WAIVER 15 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams III,
eds., 2001).
66. Id. at 15-16 (outlining the criticisms directed against the juvenile system during
the 1960s).
67. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (analyzing the due process protections that a juvenile is enti-
tled to receive under the Constitution). Morris Kent, a sixteen year old, was arrested for
robbery and rape after fingerprints found in the victim's apartment were matched to prints
taken from him when he was fourteen years old. Id. at 543-44. He was interrogated by the
police for seven hours, during which time he admitted to the offenses. Id. Because Kent
was sixteen years old at the time, the District of Columbia Juvenile Court had exclusive
jurisdiction over him. Id. at 543. Kent was detained for nearly a week without arraign-
ment. Id. at 544-45. Although Kent's attorney filed a motion for a hearing on whether the
juvenile court would waive jurisdiction over Kent, the juvenile court judge held no hearing
and instead entered an order waiving jurisdiction without making any findings. Id. at
545-46.
68. Id. at 557 ("The child is protected against consequences of adult conviction such as
the loss of civil rights, the use of adjudication against him in subsequent proceedings, and
disqualification for public employment.").
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hearing to determine waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, as well as a
judicial statement explaining the reasons for the waiver, if waiver is
granted." Further, Kent held counsel for a juvenile must be given access
to social records and similar reports that the judge will consider during
the waiver hearing.70
In re Gault,71 argued before the Supreme Court in the same year as
Kent, again extended due process rights for juveniles.7 2 The Court held,
in cases in which the juvenile could be confined, notice must be provided
"sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings," describing the
alleged misconduct with reasonable specificity." Gault also held, in a
proceeding in which the juvenile's freedom is in question, the juvenile
and his or her parents must be informed of the juvenile's right to repre-
sentation, and counsel must be appointed if the child cannot afford an
attorney.74 Furthermore, the Court held the privilege against self-incrim-
ination applies to juveniles and, in the absence of an authentic confession,
69. Id. (holding that before a juvenile court can validly waive jurisdiction over a juve-
nile, due process affords the juvenile the right to a hearing and the right to counsel). The
Court held that the juvenile's attorney must have access to the social records, probation
reports, or other reports which the juvenile court will consider at the hearing. Id Further-
more, the juvenile court must state the reasons for the court's decision. Id. The statement
of reasons from the juvenile court need not be formal or include "conventional findings of
fact"; however, the statement must show that the question of waiver was carefully consid-
ered. Id. at 561.
70. Id. (acknowledging the importance of the waiver decision). In reviewing the origi-
nal purposes of the juvenile courts, the Court noted the questions that had recently arisen
as to whether juvenile courts were equipped with the resources to sufficiently fulfill the
role of the state as parens patriae. Id. at 555-56. The court went on to note that, "[t]here is
evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Id. at 556. The Court noted the
quandary of children in the juvenile system, but declined to rule on constitutional guaran-
tees which would apply to an adult in Kent's situation. Id.
71. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
72. Id. at 57. Gerald Gault, a fifteen year old, was arrested in Arizona for making a
lewd telephone call to a neighbor. Id. at 4. Gerald's parents were not notified of his arrest,
and once a petition was filed with the court, the Gaults did not receive service of the
petition. Id. at 5. At the habeas corpus hearing, the neighbor who had made the allega-
tions of the lewd phone call neither appeared nor testified. Id. at 7. Due to the neighbor's
absence, Gerald was not identified at the hearing as the voice of the caller. Id. After the
hearing, the judge committed fifteen year old Gerald to the State Industrial School, "for
the period of his minority." Id. In Arizona, a juvenile's minority lasted until he or she was
twenty-one years old. Id. The referral report, filed by the probation officers and never
disclosed to the Gaults, listed the charge against Gerald as "Lewd Phone Calls." Id.
73. Id. at 33 (rejecting the Supreme Court of Arizona's reasoning regarding notice).
The Court quipped, "[b]eing a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id. at 27-28.
74. Id. at 41 (explaining that when a juvenile's freedom is at stake, due process man-
dates a right to counsel).
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a juvenile cannot be committed to a state institution if there is no sworn
testimony during a determination of delinquency since no meaningful op-
portunity for cross-examination exists.7 5
Following Gault, the Supreme Court continued the course of extending
due process to juveniles. The 1970 case of In re Winship76 held, in adjudi-
catory hearings, the standard of proof required for juveniles to be adjudi-
cated delinquent (the equivalent of a criminal conviction) is proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, rather than a preponderance of the evidence.7 7 In
Breed v. Jones, 7  the Supreme Court extended the protection against
double jeopardy to juveniles, holding, prior to any determination of guilt
of the juvenile, the juvenile court must determine whether to transfer a
juvenile to adult court, thereby waiving jurisdiction. 9
The trend of extending due process rights to juveniles did not last.so In
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held, in 1971, the Constitution does
not require that juveniles be afforded the right to a jury trial during the
adjudicative stage." The Court expressed a reluctance to alter the "inti-
mate" juvenile proceeding by requiring jury trials for juveniles and thus
turning the juvenile system into a completely adversarial process. 8 2
After McKeiver, the Court, in the 1979 case Bellotti v. Baird, succinctly
explained its justifications for concluding that the constitutional rights af-
forded to children and adults are not equal: "the peculiar vulnerability of
75. Id. at 55, 57 (extending the protections of the Fifth Amendment to juveniles). The
Court acknowledged issues will arise with regard to wavier of a child's privilege, however,
the Court insisted that while technique might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the
principle of the privilege will remain constant. Id.
76. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
77. Id. at 365-66, 368 ("The same considerations that demand extreme caution in
factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child."). The Court
considered the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt just as important as the
constitutional safeguards discussed in Gault. Id. at 368.
78. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
79. Id. at 535-36 (stating that extending the constitutional safeguard against multiple
trials will not diminish the flexibility and informality of the juvenile system).
80. Gerald P. Hill, II., Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in
Juvenile Proceedings Under the Sixth Amendment, 9 FL. CoAsTAiL L. Re'v. 143, 153 (2008).
81. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (noting that despite the fail-
ings of the juvenile court to achieve their original goals, the Court will not flatly hold all
constitutional rights afforded to adults as applicable to juveniles). The Court explained
that although the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee a juvenile the right to a jury, states
are free to "experiment" and may allow juries for juveniles however the State chooses. Id.
at 547.
82. Id. The reluctance to completely equate juveniles with adults reflects a commit-
ment by the Supreme Court to the separation between children and adults under the law.
This commitment is important when one considers the appropriateness of moving young
offenders into adult courts and prisons. The Supreme Court has consistently asserted
juveniles are special and different from adults.
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children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing."8 3
These reasons have been relied upon by the Supreme Court and others
time and again to explain why particular constitutional protections do not
apply to minors." The reasons articulated in Bellotti provide insight into
the struggle for balance in the juvenile justice system. Children are dif-
ferent: they are special, vulnerable, and immature. Legislators have tried
to both protect children and hold them accountable, but lawmakers
sometimes pass reactionary legislation in response to public outcry over
"out of control" youth. Current transfer laws serve as examples of mis-
guided and counterproductive legislation.
C. Juvenile Transfer
Since the inception of juvenile courts in the United States, judges had
the power to transfer cases to adult court, if they determined the charge
was serious enough. 6 When a child is transferred to adult court, the ju-
venile court transfers its jurisdiction, or "waives" it, to the adult criminal
justice system." This process is frequently called "certification" or
"waiver."" Until recently, the transfer of a juvenile to adult criminal
83. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (analyzing the validity of a Massachu-
setts statute that required an unmarried minor to obtain parental consent before receiving
an abortion).
84. E.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 n.6 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S.
at 634).
85. See generally Craig Hemmens & Katherine Bennett, Out in the Street: Juvenile
Crime, Juvenile Curfews, and the Constitution, 34 GONz. L. Ruv. 267 (1999) (discussing the
constitutionality of government-imposed juvenile curfews as a means to deter criminal ac-
tivity and protect juveniles from victimization).
86. DAVID L. MYERS, ExcLUDING VIOLENT Younis FROM JUVENILE COURTr: THE
EiFFCTIvENEss oF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 14-15 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams
III, eds., 2001) (discussing the Cook County juvenile court process of transferring older
boys to adult courts and the fact that by transferring the more notorious juvenile cases, the
critics of the courts were held at bay).
87. RANDAiuI G. SHELDEN, DEuLINQUENCY AND JUVENIUE JUSICE IN AMERICAN So-
ciETY 341 (2006) (noting that transfer is a rapidly growing change in juvenile justice).
Transfer may occur because the juvenile court views the youth as too dangerous or "not
amenable to treatment." Id. All states have laws allowing juvenile transfer to adult court.
Id. Several states have no minimum age in place for transfer, while others allow transfer
for children between the ages of ten and fourteen to adult court in certain circumstances.
MICHELE DErrcn ET AL., TiE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON Sci. o
Pun. AFFAIRs, FROM TIME Ouir To HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN TIHE ADUI T CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SysnM 24-26 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/From%20
Time%200ut%20to%20Hard%20Time-revised%20final.pdf (listing each of the fifty states
and the state policy on juvenile transfer to adult court).
88. RANDAlu G. SHELDEN, DEINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN So-
CIETY 341 (2006).
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court was a rare occurrence, and most young people remained in the ju-
venile system.8 9 But then, in response to a "much publicized juvenile
'crime wave'" during the late 1980s and early 1990s, most states changed
their laws to enable the transfer of juveniles to adult courts.90 "Since
1992, forty-five states have passed or amended legislation making it easier
to prosecute juveniles as adults."9' Consequently, the number of youths
in adult jails increased by 208% from 1990 to 2004.92 As law professor
Helen M. Alvare stated, "The opportunity cost of this outcome was fewer
juveniles receiving the benefits of the rehabilitation programs offered in
the juvenile justice system." 93 Citing some of the problems with this
change, Professor Alvare continued, "in adult prisons-dubbed by some
as 'crime schools' for juveniles-minors were more likely to be abused,
and even to commit suicide, than were minors sent to juvenile pro-
grams." 9 4 Interestingly, crime rates among juveniles have steadily de-
clined since the mid 1990s,9 ' though, in all likelihood, this cannot be
attributed to strict transfer laws, since numerous studies have shown
transfer actually increases recidivism, and no strong evidence exists to
support the argument that strict transfer laws operate as a general
deterrent.96
89. DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENILE COURT: TH-E
EFFECTIVFNESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 15 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams III,
eds., 2001).
90. Helen M. Alvare, Symposium on Youth and the Law: Foreword: A Common
Theme, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETriics & Pun. Po 'v 1, 3 (2008).
91. Nancy E. Gist, Foreword to JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEi"T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILES IN ADUIT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL AsseSsMiErN-r iii (2000).
92. NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 155 (2007), http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/226680.pdf (discussing the special vulnerability of juveniles held in
confinement with adults).
93. Helen M. Alvare, Symposium on Youth and the Law: Foreword: A Common
Theme, 22 NOTREu DAME J.L. EHIincs & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 (2008).
94. Id. (highlighting the problems with the increase in juveniles serving time in adult
prisons as a result of harsher transfer laws) (footnote omitted).
95. Id.
96. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delin-
quency? JUVENILE JUSiCE BULLETIN, Aug. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/ojjdp220595.pdf.
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III. JUVENILES DESERVE DIFFERENT TREATMENT AND THEREFORE
JUVENILE TRANSFER SHOULD BE LIMITED
A. Juvenile Offenders are Less Culpable than Adult Offenders
"Culpability" is used to describe a handful of overlapping concepts in-
cluding responsibility, accountability, and blameworthiness.9 7 The legal
system has traditionally recognized that punishment for criminal acts
should correspond not only to the harm caused by the crime, but also to
the blameworthiness of the actor.98 Blameworthiness, in turn, depends
on the person committing the crime as well as the surrounding circum-
stances of the wrongful act.9 9 Courts typically consider a variety of miti-
gating factors when determining the culpability of an offender, including
the person's character and any evidence of impaired decision making. 00
The idea that adolescents are more amenable to treatment and more ca-
pable of true rehabilitation is grounded in both common sense and in the
history of the American legal system.'o' As the previous section out-
lined, the history of the juvenile justice system in the United States was
based on the idea that juveniles should be treated differently and that
they can and should be rehabilitated instead of punished.' 02 As such,
children were considered potentially less blameworthy.10
The notion that the law recognizes the differences between adults and
children can be best illustrated by considering the limitations and restric-
tions it places on minors for certain types of activities.' 04 For example,
parental consent is required by thirty-six states for youth under eighteen
97. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on Juris-
dictional Boundary, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 379, 393 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
98. MACARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCii NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOF-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, IsSUE BRIEF 3: LESS Gullry vY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE
1 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief-3.pdf.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTiS FROM JUVENILE COURT:
THE EFFECTiVENESS oi LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 12 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams
III, eds., 2001).
102. MICHELE DEITCH ET AL., THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, LYN1ON B. JOHNSON
SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, FROM TIME OUT To HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE
ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/
From%20Time%200ut%20to%20Hard%20Time-revised%20final.pdf.
103. See MACARTiiUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVEL-
OPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 3: LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLES-
CENCE 1-3 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief_3.pdf.
104. MICHELE DEITCH ET AL., THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON
SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, FROM TIME OUT To HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE
ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10-11 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/
file/From%20Time%200ut%20to%2OHard%2OTime-revised%20final.pdf (explaining the
2010]1 333
THE SCHOLAR
years old to marry; minors cannot buy pornography in forty-eight states,
either because the sale is absolutely prohibited, or parental consent must
first be obtained; forty-two states limit the minor's ability to get a tattoo
by either requiring parental consent or absolutely prohibiting the practice
until the minor reaches eighteen; body piercing is limited by thirty-three
states and minors in those states must either obtain parental permission
or are prohibited altogether from getting a body piercing; and forty-two
states and the District of Columbia do not allow youth under eighteen
years old to obtain a driver's license completely free from legal restric-
tions.'0 5 These are just a handful of examples illustrating the law's differ-
ing treatment of children and adults, reflecting the belief that children
and adults are fundamentally different.' 0 6 The law's recognition that cer-
tain activities should be restricted for youth speaks to a young person's
culpability for the wrongful conduct. After all, if the law reflects the be-
lief that a minor is incapable of properly weighing the decision to get a
tattoo, then when a minor makes an ill-considered choice to commit a
robbery, the law must take into account the decision was comparatively
less well-considered, recognizing the minor's diminished culpability in the
act.
i. Scientific Data and the Diminished Culpability of Youth
Brain development research shows physiological differences account
for many of the disparities between adult and adolescent thought
processes. Decision-making capabilities of adolescents develop at vary-
ing rates.' 0 7 While cognitive capacities for processing and reasoning are
likely similar to those of adults by the middle of adolescence, the ability
of teens to make "real-life decisions" is less developed.'s Thus, although
research shows intellectual abilities are fully developed by the time an
well established practice of state legislatures passing laws distinguishing between the rights
of adults and juveniles).
105. Id. at 11 (listing a wide variety of areas in which the rights of juveniles are limited
by state laws).
106. MICHELE DEITCH ET AL., TiH UNIV. oF TEX. AT AUSTIN, LYNDON B. JoHNSoN
ScHi. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, FROM TIME Our To HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE
ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/filel
From %20Time%200ut%20to%2OHard%2OTime-revised%20final.pdf.
107. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Tex. L. RIv. 799,
811 (2003) (discussing the point at which adolescent cognitive development is comparable
to adults).
108. Id. (explaining that physiological inequalities between adults and adolescents are
not the cause of poor judgment by adolescents); MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH
NETWORK ON ADOLESCENTr DEVELOPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 3: LESS
GunY Bv REASON oiF ADOLESCENCE 2 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue-
brief_3.pdf.
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individual reaches about sixteen years of age,"o' the psycho-social devel-
opment of an adolescent progresses less rapidly than cognitive ability,110
and continues to evolve well into early adulthood."' Consequently, the
decisions made by teens are different than those made by adults due to
teens' immature judgment.1 12
Adolescents are limited in their capacity to consider hypothetical situa-
tions, and this limitation may be responsible for teens' general lack of
skills in properly accounting for the future."' Youths also tend "to weigh
more heavily short-term consequences of decisions-both risks and bene-
fits-in making choices." 1 14 For example, one study involved an exercise
in which adolescents and adults were asked questions such as, "Would
you rather have $100 today or $1,000 a year from now?"' 15 The results
showed adolescents were willing to accept a lower amount of money in
order to get paid immediately instead of waiting for a sum of money that
was ten times as large.116
Teens also tend to focus on the rewards of an action, while generally
overlooking the risks attached to it."' It is not difficult to envision how
impulsivity can create negative consequences for a juvenile in a high-risk
109. MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOP-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEi 3: LESS GuILTY By REASON OF ADOILESCENCE
2 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief 3.pdf (explaining the results of a
study conducted of roughly 1,000 people between ten and thirty years of age). The study
sought to explain the differences in age groups in decision-making and the factors that are
relevant to mitigation and that change over time, such as impulsivity, future consequences,
and the ability to resist peer pressure. Id. The subjects of the study were chosen from five
different regions in the country and were diverse both socioeconomically and ethnically.
Id. The results of the study were in line with other recent findings from the neuroscience
field. Id. at 3.
110. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REv. 799,
811-13 (2003) (describing adolescence as a period of identity formation).
111. MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NEIWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOP-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIIF 3: LESS GuILry By REASON OF ADOLESCENCE
2 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief 3.pdf.
112. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REV. 799,
813 (2003) ("While cognitive capacities shape the process of decision-making, immature
judgment can affect outcomes because these developmental factors influence adolescent
values and preferences that drive the cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices.").
113. Id. at 814 (explaining that adolescents prefer to live in the present, rather than
consider events that have yet to occur).
114. Id. (attributing poor judgment by adolescents to an inability to weigh the long-
term consequences of their actions).
115. MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH! NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOP-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 3: LESS GUILTY By REASON OF ADOLESCENCE
2 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief 3.pdf.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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situation." 8 Peer pressure is also a major factor in a minor's ability to
make decisions. Recent neuroscientific research reveals "that the brain
systems that govern the processing of emotional and social information
are affected by the hormonal changes of puberty in ways that make peo-
ple more sensitive to the reactions of those around them."" 9 Conse-
quently, adolescents are more susceptible to peer pressure than adults. 20
Perhaps most significantly, brain research indicates the parts of the
brain that relate to the highest-level functioning, like abstract reasoning,
are the last to develop.121 This delay "affects judgment and decision
making by impeding the ability to plan ahead and learn from past experi-
ence."12 2 Skills including regulating emotion, controlling impulses, evalu-
ating risk, and future planning are all negatively impacted by the late
development of the regions of the brain responsible for these abilities.'23
The frontal lobe of the brain, which is among the last parts of the brain to
develop, is responsible for the most advanced functions.124 in fact, recent
neurological research shows the brain is not fully formed, or fully devel-
oped, until twenty-five years of age.12 5
All of these findings inform the determination of a minor's culpability
for an illegal act. The data show that, in critical ways, juvenile minds are
less developed than adult minds and thus are generally less culpable for
their criminal acts.126 Obviously, the law does not need science to con-
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. MAcARTHiuR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOP-
MENT ANID JUVENIUIS JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEFi' 3: LEss Gui'ry ay REASON OiF ADOLESCENCE
3 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief_3.pdf.
121. Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, The American Bar Association's Youth at Risk
Initiative: Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in Delinquency Cases: Creating a Para-
digm for Specialized Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM. Cr. Rav 466, 474 (2007).
122. Id.
123. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TIx. L. REsv. 799,
816 (2003).
124. MICiILEu Difrfcii EI AL., THE UNIV. oF TiX. AT AUSTIN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON
SCII. O PUB. AFFAIRS, FROM TIME Our To HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THEL
Aoulur CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-11sM 13-14 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/
file/From%20Time%200ut%20to%2OHard%2OTime-revised%20final.pdf.
125. Id. at 13.
126. MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCii NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEvEio1-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIF 3: LEss Guiry Yv REASON OF ADOLESCENCE
1-3 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief.3.pdf (discussing adolescents'
underdeveloped psychosocial capabilities, their characteristic short-sighted decision mak-
ing, poor impulse control, and vulnerability to peer pressure). The report argues that de-
velopmental immaturity should be added to the traditional list of mitigating factors that
courts consider when determining a particular defendant's culpability. Id. at 1. Explaining
the traditional factors of mitigation, the report lists impaired decision making capacity,
typically as a result of mental illness or disability; the specific circumstances of the criminal
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firm this fact. As previously noted, the idea that children deserve differ-
ent treatment than adults, and thus are potentially less blameworthy,
formed the basis of the development of the juvenile justice system. 1 2 7
However, transfer laws throw out this common-sense notion, and there-
fore should be severely limited in their use. Although not addressing
transfer laws per se, the U.S. Supreme Court engaged in thoughtful and
lengthy consideration of the culpability of youth in the recent death pen-
alty decision of Roper v. Simmons.128
ii. Roper v. Simmons and the Death Penalty for Youth
The culpability of an individual under eighteen years of age was at is-
sue in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Roper v. Simmons.12 9 In
Roper, seventeen-year-old Simmons brutally murdered a woman by
breaking into her home, tying her up, taking her to a state park, and
throwing her into a river.' 30 She drowned and her body was found a few
days later.131 Simmons was tried and convicted as an adult, and a jury
sentenced him to death.13 2 Simmons obtained new counsel and on appeal
act; and the personal character of the accused, which may give insight into the level of risk
that person poses of continuing criminal behavior. Id.
127. Id. (outlining the arguments advanced by proponents of tougher juvenile laws,
which hold that since youths are committing more serious offenses involving guns and
drugs, adult punishment is necessary). The report points out that the entire premise of the
juvenile system is dependent on the belief that adults and juveniles are not equally culpa-
ble for wrongful actions. Id.
128. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (holding that the imposition of
the death penalty on youth who were under eighteen years of age at the time they commit-
ted an offense constitutes a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
129. Id. at 578. The American Bar Association (ABA) came out against capital pun-
ishment for youth who committed offenses while under the age of eighteen in 1983. Adam
Caine Ortiz, Juvenile Death Penalty: Is it "Cruel and Unusual" in Light of Contemporary
Standards?, 17 CRIM. Jus-r. 21, 21 (2003). The ABA resolution, drawing on "the lessons
and history of the juvenile court system," which clarifies that juvenile offenders should not
be treated in the same way as adults and not subject to the same sanctions as adult
criminals, asserted "adolescents are most amenable to treatment and rehabilitation." Id
In illustrating this point, Ortiz discussed the cases of two seventeen year olds-Simmons
from Missouri, and Beazley from Texas-who were both sentenced to die. Id. While in
prison, both behaved like model prisoners, expressing "great remorse for their crimes." Id.
Both young men cared for fellow inmates, participated in community service, and espoused
firm religious beliefs: "Photogenic and articulate, they both attracted international atten-
tion." Id. In May of 2002, Simmons was granted a temporary stay of execution by the
Missouri State Supreme Court to determine whether his sentence of execution was consid-
ered cruel and unusual. Id. Beazley, on the other hand, was executed in Texas. Id.
130. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-57.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 557-58 (outlining the facts and procedural history of Simmons' case).
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asserted that his previous counsel had been ineffective at trial.'3 3 Wit-
nesses were called to lend support to this contention, including the
clinical psychologists who had met with Simmons and conducted evalua-
tions on him.1 34 The testimony revealed "that Simmons was 'very imma-
ture,' 'very impulsive,' and 'very susceptible to being manipulated or
influenced.'""3  The testimony included a description of Simmons' home
life as difficult and his behavior as having changed dramatically.'3 6
Before his crime, Simmons was away from home for extensive periods of
time, using drugs and alcohol with others.13 1 Simmons' counsel argued
all of the factors attested to by the expert witnesses should have been
asserted during the sentencing proceeding and the assistance of Simmons'
counsel was ineffective for not having done so.' 3" The trial court dis-
agreed and denied Simmons' motion for post conviction relief, finding no
constitutional violation. 33 The ruling was affirmed by the Missouri Su-
preme Court in 1997.140 Roper remained in prison until Atkins v. Vir-
ginia was decided, after which he renewed his appeal.1 4'
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins, holding that execut-
ing mentally retarded individuals fails to uphold the two justifications for
the death penalty-retribution and deterrence-and therefore it is cruel
and unusual to impose the death penalty on mentally retarded
criminals.' 4 2 In Atkins, the Court stated:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between
right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their
impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical rea-
soning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in
criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that
they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated
plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than lead-
133. Id. at 558 (describing the justification behind Simmons' act of securing new
council).
134. Id. at 559.
135. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559 (describing Simmons' attorney's attempt to assert the rele-
vance of Simmons mental and behavioral characteristics to the prior hearing).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
141. Id.
142. Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (construing the Eighth Amendment in
light of "evolving standards of decency").
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ers. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.14 3
After Atkins was decided, Simmons attempted to gain state post-con-
viction relief.1" Simmons argued before the Missouri Supreme Court
that the Court's reasoning in Atkins applies to juveniles as well, and bars
the execution of individuals who were under the age of eighteen when
they committed the offense.14 5 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with
Simmons and set aside his death sentence, instead sentencing him to life
imprisonment.146 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice
Kennedy authored the opinion of the Court.147 After a thorough review
of the Court's decisions relating to the death penalty,14 8 Justice Kennedy
turned to the question in Roper: "whether the death penalty is a dispro-
portionate punishment for juveniles."14 9 Justice Kennedy noted with ap-
proval15 0 the language in Atkins that described the need to limit
execution only to individuals who commit "a narrow category of the most
serious crimes""'5 and "whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most
deserving of execution.' "1 5 2 The Court noted three differences between
juveniles and adults: (1) the absence of maturity in youth and an underde-
veloped understanding of the youth's own responsibility for his or her
actions; (2) the special vulnerability, including the susceptibility of youth
to negative influences, including peer pressure; and (3) the fact that the
character of a minor is not as permanently formed as the character of an
143. Id. at 318 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
144. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 559-60 (noting that the Missouri Supreme Court sentenced Simmons to
"life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the
governor").
147. Id. at 551.
148. Prior to Roper, in 1988, the Supreme Court ruled in Thompson v. Oklahoma that
imposing the death penalty on an individual who committed an offense when they were
less than sixteen years of age was unconstitutional and violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (refraining from ex-
tending their ruling to include persons who committed offenses when they were over six-
teen years of age but under eighteen years of age). The next year, however, in Stanford v.
Kentucky, the Court ruled that executing individuals for crimes committed when they were
between sixteen and eighteen years old did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). Stanford held that there is "neither a historical nor
modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person
who murders at 16 or 17 years of age." Id.
149. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
150. Id. at 568.
151. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (restricting the severity of punishment to reflect the of-
fender's culpability).
152. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
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adult.15 3 Justice Kennedy expressly stated that due to these differences,
juveniles cannot be considered among the worst offenders.15 4
In elaborating on the first difference, the lack of maturity among youth,
the Court noted juveniles frequently behave impetuously, and make ill-
considered decisions. 55 In explaining the second difference, that minors
are especially vulnerable to bad influences, the Court stated youths actu-
ally have less control over their environments than adults, and are less
able to get themselves out of potentially harmful or "criminogenic" set-
tings.' 56 Finally, in describing the third difference, that of a less well-
formed character, Justice Kennedy asserted, "The personality traits of
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed."' 5 ' The opinion concluded that
due to these differences, the two justifications for the death penalty, retri-
bution and deterrence, simply do not apply sufficiently to juveniles as
they do to adults.158 Thus, the Court determined imposing the death pen-
alty on individuals who committed crimes before they were eighteen
years old constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and is a violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 9
iii. Applying the Roper Analysis to Juvenile Transfer
Although Roper did not address the question of juvenile transfer to
adult court, the Court's reasoning speaks to the wisdom of certifying
juveniles to stand trial as adults. The Supreme Court's justifications for
its ruling, namely, the three differences between adults and juveniles,
counsel against treating children and adults identically, as is the case
when a minor is transferred to adult court. In Roper, the Court stated:
The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means
it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime commit-
ted by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.
From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that
a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed.'
The Roper Court held the culpability or blameworthiness of juveniles is
significantly diminished due to juveniles' youth and immaturity, thus, the
153. Id. at 569-70 (relying on a variety of scientific studies and amici in recognizing
the three major differences between adults and juveniles).
154. Id. at 570.
155. Id. at 569.
156. Id.
157. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
158. Id. at 571-72.
159. Id. at 578.
160. Id. at 570.
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law must account for the differences between youth and adults.1 61 Simi-
larly, transfer of minors to the adult system should be used in only the
most exceptional circumstances, and protections must be in place to en-
sure juveniles are not routinely routed out of the specialized juvenile sys-
tem and into the less rehabilitative adult criminal justice system. As
noted in Roper, scientific data support the contention that juveniles are
less culpable than adults.162
The Roper analysis, which relied heavily on scientific brain research, 1 63
counsels for a continuation of the use of separate systems for juvenile and
adult offenders." When a juvenile is certified to stand trial as an adult,
the important distinctions between the culpability of adults and children
are lost.1 65 The wisdom of viewing and treating minors differently from
adults is overshadowed by the punitive desire to make minors "pay" for
their crimes. The problem with the view, "adult time for adult crime," is
that it simply does not work.1 6 6 Juvenile transfer heightens the costs to
society and ultimately society is less safe. Further evidence that transfer
should be used sparingly is revealed in studies of juveniles in adult correc-
tions facilities showing the detrimental effects of locking juveniles up with
adult criminals.
161. See id. at 570-72.
162. MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLFSCENT DEVELOP-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUL BRIFe 3: LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE
2 (2010), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief-3.pdf; see Elizabeth S. Scott &
Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REv. 799, 816-17 (2003).
163. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
164. See Helen M. Alvare, Symposium on Youth and the Law: Foreword: A Common
Theme, 22 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 1, 4 (2008).
165. As Professor Alvare points out:
[O]ver the last decade, the weight of the research evidence has increased, not de-
creased, which indicates that adolescents are not the equal of adults in the areas of
judgment, impulse control, risk assessment, and the ability to resist negative peer and
community influences. That youths' incomplete development mitigates their culpabil-
ity was acknowledged as common sense by the U.S. Supreme Court's Thompson v.
Oklahoma and Roper v. Simmons opinions.
Helen M. Alvare, Symposium on Youth and the Law: Foreword: A Common Theme, 22
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
166. See MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVEL-
OPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 5: THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2010), http://
www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issue-brief_5.pdf (explaining that although proponents of
harsher policies for youth believe that making juveniles do "hard time" will serve as a
deterrent, in reality, a large-scaled New York study showed the opposite, that recidivism
rates increase when juveniles serve time in adult facilities).
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B. Locking up Juveniles with Adults Hurts Everyone
i. Increased Victimization and Suicide Rates
Adult jails are unsafe places for children, and unsurprisingly, youth
who are incarcerated with adults are at high risk of physical and sexual
assault.'6 7 A 2007 report by the National Prison Rape Elimination Com-
mission found juveniles incarcerated in adult jails and prisons are at a
much higher risk for sexual abuse, noting that although youth made up
less than 1% of those confined in adult jails in 2005, juveniles accounted
for 21% of the victims of the substantiated inmate-perpetrated sexual vi-
olence that occurred that year.' 68 Another study found juveniles held in
adult prisons are five times more likely to be sexually victimized than
those held in juvenile facilities. 169 Because prisoners are often reluctant
to report sexual abuse, the actual instances of abuse are likely much
higher than surveys reveal.170 Criminologist Jeffrey Fagan notes,
"[B]ecause they are physically diminutive, [juveniles] are subject to at-
tack. . . . They will become somebody's 'girlfriend' very, very fast." 17 ' A
prison guard in one report stated there is almost zero chance for a young
inmate to avoid being raped: "He'll get raped within the first twenty-four
hours to forty-eight hours. That's almost standard."172
167. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH1 JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: TiE DANGERS OF INCAR-
CERATING YOUTH IN Aoui r JAILS IN AMERICA 4 (2007), http://www.campaign4youth
justice.org/Downloads/National ReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing_. uvenilesReport_2007-11-
15.pdf.
168. NATIONAL PRISON RAPE EIMINATION COMMISSION Ri'rT 42 (2007), http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/226680.pdf (comparing the rates of abuse among jails and residen-
tial correctional facilities). Other populations especially vulnerable to sexual abuse include
individuals who are small in stature, female prisoners, survivors of past sexual abuse, indi-
viduals who are physically or developmentally disabled, gays, lesbians, bisexuals, trans-
gender people, and immigration detainees. Id. at 70-73, 147, 175.
169. RANDAiLL G. SoELDIN, DE INQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
SocurrIiY 344 (2006) (describing the results of a study comparing young people in juvenile
training schools with youth in adult prisons). The study found that roughly 10% of youths
in adult prisons disclosed they had been sexually assaulted, while only about 1% of young
people in juvenile training schools reported being sexually assaulted. Id. Studies in other
countries reveal similar results. Id. A study in Australia of youth in one prison found that
25% of the young people reported they had been victims of sexual assault. Id. Addition-
ally, a Canadian survey of a federal prison revealed that twenty-year old prisoners were
eight times more likely to have been sexually assaulted than older inmates. Id.
170. NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION RErowr 101 (2007), http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/226680.pdf (discussing the reasons why incarcerated individuals do
not report instances of sexual abuse and the need for improvements in order to promote
reporting in correctional facilities).
171. RANDAiLI G. SHELDEN, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
Sociu--ry 344 (2006) (explaining that within male prisons, the typical victim is the youngest
prisoner).
172. Id.
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The devastating and lifelong effects of sexual abuse cannot be over-
stated. Juveniles sexually abused while in confinement are likely to be
plagued by lasting emotional and psychological consequences. 7 3 These
damaging effects can heighten the risk of drug abuse and recidivism.17 4
Depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, anger, hopelessness, difficulty
with impulse control, dissociative episodes, a poor sense of self, deep feel-
ings of shame, and flashbacks are all strongly correlated with sexual
abuse."17  Similarly, "[a] history of childhood sexual abuse is strongly cor-
related with higher rates of attempted suicide, alcohol dependence, nico-
tine dependence, social anxiety, and divorce." 7 6
Yet another cost of incarcerating youth is their increased risk of sui-
cide.177 Suicide ranks as the third most common cause of death among
fifteen to twenty-four year olds in the general population."' When youth
are incarcerated, they "are 19 times more likely to commit suicide in jail
than youth in the general population and 36 times more likely to commit
suicide in an adult jail than in a juvenile detention facility.""' 9 Moreover,
for every completed suicide among individuals between ages fifteen to
twenty-four, several hundred attempts are made. 8 0
The data convincingly outlines the high probability that a young person
in an adult facility will become the target of physical and sexual violence
and be at higher risk for suicide.' 8 1 Children deserve protection while
173. NATIONAL PRISON RAPE EIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 153 (2007), http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/226680.pdf (outlining the many difficulties that youth who experi-
ence sexual abuse in detention facilities must contend with throughout the remainder of
their lives).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCAR-
CERATING YOUTil IN AOUsir JAILS IN AMERICA 10 (2007), http://www.campaign4youth
justice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing-JuvenilesReport_2007-11-
15.pdf.
178. Id. (noting that juveniles are already at heightened risk of suicide by virtue of
their ages and incarceration only intensifies and increases the risk).
179. Id. at 4 (footnote omitted) (discussing the impact of time at an adult jail on the
juvenile psyche). The "best estimates" regarding suicide rates among incarcerated youth
mentioned above were reported by the Centers for Disease Control in a 1978 study. Id. at
10. Some jail personnel attempt to remove youth from adult inmates in order to protect
them, only to place the juveniles in near total isolation. Id. at 4. A juvenile in isolation is
often "locked down 23 hours a day in small cells with no natural light." Id. These condi-
tions lead to anxiety and paranoia, intensify existing mental disorders, and lead to a greater
risk of suicide. Id.
180. Id. at 10 (stating that non-lethal suicide attempts can severely affect a young
person's general health and state of being).
181. JAMEs AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'-T OF JUSTICE, JUVENIILES IN ADU[ T PRISONS
AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 9 (2000) (noting that due to the increased risks
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they grow and mature, and adult jails and prisons are entirely inappropri-
ate environments for youth, even those youth who have committed hei-
nous acts. In fact, the youth who have engaged in the most serious
criminal acts are the ones most in need of intervention, rehabilitation,
therapy, and treatment. While the juvenile justice system is by no means
perfect, only the juvenile justice system is equipped to provide the neces-
sary treatment for the "worst" of the nation's young offenders. Youth
must be held accountable for their actions. But punishing them in the
adult system does not accomplish any meaningful or positive outcome for
the individual youth, or for society as a whole. Additionally, when young
offenders are victimized, they are more likely to become aggressive with
women and children in the future.18 2 Keeping juvenile offenders out of
the adult system not only helps the individual, but also benefits society by
reducing the harmful effects following the aftermath of violence perpe-
trated against a young offender.
ii. Increased Recidivism Rates and Stigma: What Happens Once
Juveniles are Released
Juveniles who are prosecuted as adults are more likely to re-offend
than youth who remain in the juvenile system."' The Centers for Dis-
eases Control and Prevention found youth who are certified as adults are
roughly "34% more likely than youth retained in the juvenile court sys-
tem to be re-arrested for violent or other crime."18 4 A number of other
studies have concluded minors convicted in adult criminal court have
higher recidivism rates than similar offenders who remain in the juvenile
system and are adjudicated in juvenile courts.18 5 A MacArthur Founda-
tion study of over 2,000 young offenders who committed either burglary,
aggravated assault, or armed robbery found the offenders who were pros-
ecuted in the adult system were 85% more likely to be re-arrested for
violent crimes than those kept in the juvenile system; they were also 44%
more likely than youth remaining in the juvenile courts to be re-arrested
experienced by transferred youth, adult correctional systems are faced with new
problems). The studies that provide hard facts on the numbers of abused young people in
adult prisons are not surprising; these revelations are rooted in common sense.
182. RANDAuL G. SHEiLDEiN, DEINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
Socur-y 344 (2006).
183. National Statistics, CAMPAIGN FOR YOuTH JuSr., http://www.campaign4youthjus-
tice.org/national-statistics.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
184. Id.
185. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delin-
quency? JUVENILE JusTIciE BULLETiIN, Aug. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
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for felony property offenses.' 86 Yet another report on juveniles in adult
courts found children processed through the adult system stand a greater
chance of being re-arrested more frequently and more quickly for com-
mitting serious crimes.' 87
Recidivism and deterrence are intimately related. In line with the find-
ings on recidivism, "[s]tudies show that transfer [laws] fail[] to deter vio-
lent juvenile offenders."'8 8 Various studies on transfer depict an increase
in recidivism rates among these offenders.s' More broadly, transfer, in
terms of both specific and general deterrence, is not as effective as ini-
tially anticipated. 9 0 Six large-scale studies have examined whether trans-
fer results in specific deterrence and have found recidivism rates for
youth convicted in adult court were higher than similar juvenile offenders
who were tried in juvenile court." The studies that have looked at the
general deterrent effects of transfer laws, although inconsistent, seem to
suggest these laws probably "have little or no general deterrent effect in
preventing serious juvenile crime."' 92
186. MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVFIOP-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 5: THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUS-
TicE: TRANSFER OF AnotESCENTS To THE AI)utT CRIMINAL COURT 1 (2010), http://
www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issue brief 5.pdf (describing the study conducted from
1992-1999 in the New York and New Jersey area). Two groups of juveniles were tracked:
those transferred to the adult system and those who remained in the juvenile system. Id.
The individuals were chosen from the same urban area, had similar economic opportuni-
ties, similar access to weapons, and similar exposure to gang influences and drug use. Id.
The re-arrest rates were determined only after researchers controlled for time juveniles
spent on the street. Id. The methods of the study were aimed at eliminating factors that
would influence re-arrest rates so that any differences in those rates could be attributed to
the different justice systems that youths experienced. Id.
187. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCAR-
CERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAIl S IN AMERICA 4-5 (2007), http://www.campaign4youth
justice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing-JuvenilesReport_2007-11-
15.pdf (noting agreement among physicians and criminologists that minors prosecuted in
the adult system are at greater risk for re-arrest than minors that remain in the juvenile
courts).
188. Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult
Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 183
(2007).
189. Id. ("This increased recidivism manifests a failure to deter, a failure to rehabili-
tate, and most significantly, a failure to protect society.").
190. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delin-
quency? JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, Aug. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
191. Id. at 4.
192. Id. at 3 (explaining that the limited research available on the effect of juvenile
transfer laws as they relate to general deterrence is inconsistent and "does not permit
strong conclusions"). Noting the need for more research on whether transfer laws could be
implemented in such a way as to ensure a general deterrent effect, Redding outlines three
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Criminologist Jeffrey Fagan's research on juveniles reveals that al-
though transferring young people to adult court may lower community
risk by subjecting violent young offenders to lengthy incapacitation, "the
social costs of imprisoning young offenders in adult facilities may be paid
in later crime and violence upon their release."" Correspondingly, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Task Force on Community
Preventative Services found the practice of processing juveniles in the
adult criminal justice system amplifies violence, and policies that do so
are "counterproductive" to the goals of decreasing violence and strength-
ening public safety.1 94
When juveniles are released from prison, their feelings of self-worth
and their ability to move forward in life are affected by the stigma of
criminal convictions. These factors are difficult to quantify, but they are
no less real. The stigma of a felony conviction can impair a young per-
son's ability to pursue employment and educational opportunities, as well
as other positive adult roles.'95 Possibilities that might otherwise lead a
young person away from criminal activity may be made more difficult or
foreclosed altogether due to a felony conviction.' 9 6 Moreover, the
messages juveniles receive from the legal system will likely affect their
self-perception. Trying a juvenile as an adult may convey an impression
of hopelessness, leading "repeat offenses [to] become a self-fulfilling
prophecy." 97 Significantly, adult facilities offer fewer and weaker ser-
main questions that must be explored: (1) Whether youth are aware of transfer laws; (2)
Whether youth believe the laws will be used against them; and (3) Does awareness of the
transfer laws and the fact that they could be used against youths deter criminal behavior.
Id.
193. RANDAIL G. SEi DEN, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
SOCIEr 344 (2006).
194. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILEs: TIE DANGERS OF INCAR-
CERATING YOUTH IN Aour JAILS IN AMERICA 5 (2007), http://www.campaign4youthjus-
tice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-JailingJuvenilesReport_2007-11-15.
pdf.
195. MACARTrlHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOP-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 5: TiEL CIlANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUS-
TICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE Anaur CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2010), http://
www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issue brief-5.pdf; Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children as
Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v.
Simmons, 44 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 175, 184 (2007) (explaining why transfer to adult court
increases juvenile recidivism rates).
196. MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEAiRci NETrWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOP-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 5: THlE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUS-
TICiE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO TIE ADuLT CRIMINAL CouRr 4 (2010), http://
www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issue brief-5.pdf.
197. Id. Young people who have been tried as adults frequently feel that they were
unjustly treated, creating a negative perception of the justice system that leads them "to
adopt a 'delinquent self-concept' which also causes them to re-offend." Enrico Pagnanelli,
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vices, and often educational and vocational services are lacking."'s Youth
in juvenile facilities will have more opportunities for education and reha-
bilitative intervention than those incarcerated with adults.199 Perhaps
most importantly, juveniles held with adults during the critical develop-
mental stage of adolescence will be limited in their exposure to social
norms, and limited in their ability to develop a "diverse behavioral toolkit
from the wider social networks of family, school or work, and commu-
nity."2 0 0 Instead, juveniles incarcerated with adults may learn social be-
havior that legitimizes "domination, exploitation, and retaliation." 2 0 1
Young people who commit crimes must be held accountable, but they
must not be disproportionally punished by being incarcerated with adult
convicts. Young offenders deserve the educational, rehabilitative, and
therapeutic services the juvenile justice system offers. They deserve to be
safe and secure in their person,20 2 and a chance to learn a way of life that
does not involve crime. Waiving jurisdiction over a juvenile, and certify-
Note, Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the Potential Impact
of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 175, 184 (2007) (exploring the statements
made by youth who have been in the adult criminal justice system and who describe the
system as "duplicitous and manipulative, malevolent in intent, and indifferent to their
needs").
198. MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON AnotFscFNT DEVFLOP-
MENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 5: THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUS-
TICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2010), http://
www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issuebrief_5.pdf; CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING
JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 4
(2007), http://www.campaign4youthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-
JailingJuvenilesReport_2007-11-15.pdf ("A [Bureau of Justice Statistics] survey found
that 40% of jails provided no educational services at all, only 11% of jails provided special
education services, and only 7% provided vocational training.").
199. See MAcARTIIUR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVEL-
OPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 5: THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO TIE ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2010), http://
www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issue-brief_5.pdf.
200. Id.
201. Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult
Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CIzM. L. REV. 175, 184
(2007).
202. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES IN ADuLT PRISONS
AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 11 (2000) (asserting that a youth in detention has a
right to humane treatment, as well as education, metal health care, due process protection,
medical care, and access to the youth's family and the courts). These rights exist whether a
child is in a training school, a juvenile detention center, or an adult jail or prison, as the
"rights emanate from the U.S. Constitution and federal laws, including the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act; from state constitutions and laws; and from court inter-
pretations of these laws." Id. Additionally, many states have laws that give minors a right
to receive treatment and rehabilitation. Id.
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ing the juvenile to stand trial as an adult should occur only in rare circum-
stances, and Texas must make statutory changes to reflect this goal.
IV. SPECIFIC STATUTORY REFORMS
A. Waiver, Certification, and Transfer in Texas
In Texas, discretionary transfer of minors from juvenile to adult crimi-
nal court is governed by § 54.02 of the Texas Juvenile Justice Code,
"Waiver of Jurisdiction and Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court. "203
Children who are fourteen years old or older can be transferred to adult
court if they commit a capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance
felony, or a felony of the first degree.2 04 A child who is fifteen years or
older can be transferred for all of the above-listed felonies as well as for a
second or third degree felony, or a state jail felony.2 05
If a prosecutor seeks transfer, a mandatory hearing will be held, with a
judge but without a jury, during which the prosecutor seeking transfer
must show there is probable cause to believe the child committed the
alleged offense.20 6 Prior to the mandatory hearing, the court must order
and receive a complete diagnostic study, as well as a social evaluation, a
complete investigation of the juvenile, and the circumstances and details
surrounding the alleged offense. 207 During the hearing, the court may,
but is not required to, consider reports written by probation officers, pro-
fessional consultants, or professional court employees, in addition to wit-
ness testimony.2 0 8 In determining the appropriateness of transfer, the
judge is required to consider, "among other matters," the following four
factors:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with
greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the
person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likeli-
hood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services,
and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.2 09
203. Tisx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 54.02 (West Supp. 2010) (specifying the procedures that
must be followed by a juvenile court in a transfer hearing).
204. Id. § 54.02(a)(1)(A).
205. Id. § 54.02(a)(1)(B).
206. Id. §§ 54.02(a)(3), (c).
207. Id. § 54.02(d).
208. Ti-x. FAM. CoiDE ANN. § 54.02(e) (West Supp. 2010).
209. Id. § 54.02(f) (listing the factors that a judge is required to consider during a
transfer hearing).
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If the judge decides in favor of transfer, § 54.02(h) states the court
"shall state specifically in the order its reasons for waiver and certify its
action, including the written order and findings of the court." 2 1 0 After
the hearing, if a juvenile is transferred to adult court, he or she is not
allowed to file a direct appeal of the decision and must wait until con-
victed in criminal adult court before appealing the transfer decision.2 11
B. The Need for Written, Individualized Findings by Judges in Transfer
Hearings
The statutory language of § 54.02(h), outlined above, must be amended
to require judges to write out all of the court's findings that counsel in
favor of transfer. At a minimum, the court must be required to write out
its findings on each of the four specified factors it is required to consider
by § 54.02(f).2 12
While § 54.02(h) commands the court to state specifically the reasons
for waiver,213 in practice judges are not required to do much more than
rubber-stamp the order for waiver.2 14 Attorneys who practice juvenile
law recognize transfer hearings often do not live up to the ideals set out
in the Juvenile Justice Code.215 Ellen Marrus, Director of Clinical Pro-
grams for the University of Houston Law Center,2 1 6 asserts, "What
judges tend to do is rubber-stamp ... rather than consider all of the infor-
mation and the individualized nature of the child's case, which is what the
juvenile court is supposed to do." 2 17 Similarly, Dena Fisher, a former
210. Id. § 54.02(h).
211. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 44.47(b) (West 2006) (allowing an appeal of a certi-
fication order from a juvenile court "only in conjunction with an appeal of a conviction").
212. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 54.02(f), (h) (West Supp. 2010) (listing the four
factors that a judge is required to consider when determining whether a child should be
transferred to adult court).
213. Id. § 54.02(h).
214. Chris Vogel, For Their Own Good, HousToN PRESS, May 28, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 10693190 (discussing the use by juvenile courts of generic forms in waiver
hearings).
215. Id. (relaying comments from several practicing attorneys who have expressed
reservations about the transfer process).
216. Ellen Marrus, UNIVERSITY OF HOusToN LAW CENTER FACULTY, http://
www.law.uh.edulFaculty/main.asp?PID=23 (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (providing informa-
tion on the faculty position of Professor Marrus and her professional accomplishments and
publications). Professor Marrus focuses on children's rights and clinical education and has
worked at the University of Houston Law Center since 1995. Id.
217. Chris Vogel, For Their Own Good, HousTON PRESS, May 28, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 10693190 (highlighting the negative ways that certification hearings are
viewed in Texas by defense attorneys and other legal professionals). Vivian King, a crimi-
nal defense attorney, says the waiver process is "a joke. The judges don't listen to the facts
and they just certify the kids. There's no meaningful consideration of the evidence, the
2010] 349
THE SCHOLAR
Harris County prosecutor,21 8 says the thought of transfer hearings makes
her "squirm," further stating:
"I think that certification is a very big decision made with usually
only one side of the story, the officer's testimony," . . . "And it's
supposed to be based on the best interest of society and whether the
kid can be rehabilitated. It is usually a very quick decision on a very
important matter."2 1 9
Attorney Jack Carnegie of Houston supports the use of individualized
findings by judges that state the reasons why a juvenile is being certified
for adult court.2 2 0 According to Carnegie, "The form orders make the
same findings in every case, . . . and that results in these cases turning
solely on the severity of the crime, and there's a real question about
whether those other factors that the Legislature says the court is sup-
posed to consider are being properly considered."2 2 1 One of the most
worrisome examples of unfair practices in transfer hearings comes from
attorney Christene Wood, who represented a juvenile in a transfer hear-
ing where the judge "was surfing the Internet and never made eye contact
with the boy. . . . He covered his mouth and laughed during my closing
argument. It was the most shocking and appalling proceeding I've ever
seen as a lawyer in my career." 22 2
These are just a handful of examples and are not necessarily represen-
tative of the entire State of Texas. But clearly there is a need for a more
rigorous statutory requirement for judges to actually engage in a mean-
ingful analysis of the factors listed in the Texas Juvenile Justice Code.223
By allowing judges to simply sign off on a pre-printed form, current Texas
law permits judges to fail to demonstrate they have sufficiently weighed
the necessary factors and considered the seriousness of the transfer deci-
age; I didn't see any of that." Id. Not every Texas county takes certification hearings so
lightly, according to Sean McAlister, who used to work as a Harris County juvenile prose-
cutor. Id. McAlister says that Fort Bend County has a much more formal certification
process. Harris County, he says, has characteristically "read between the lines" and dis-
missed many formalities. Id.
218. Attorney Profile, Tien LAw OFFICE OF DENA Fismuis, http://www.dfisherlawof-
fice.com/1883225.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (describing the background and profes-
sional legal services of Dena Fisher, who engages in criminal and juvenile defense work).
219. Chris Vogel, For Their Own Good, HousTrON PiESs, May 28, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 10693190.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. (explaining Wood's experience with a young man she represented in Harris
County). The juvenile was certified by the judge and sent to the Harris County jail while
awaiting trial on charges of murder. Id.
223. TEx. FAM. CoiE ANN. § 54.02(f) (West Supp. 2010) (listing four specific factors
that the court must consider in certification hearings).
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sion.2 24 For a young person, the repercussions of transfer to the adult
system are far-reaching and severe. Judges must be required to record in
writing all of their findings as to why, specifically, waiver of exclusive
original jurisdiction is appropriate for each child. This will ensure judges
will pay close attention during the hearing, and spend enough time con-
sidering the matter that recording a written description of the weighing
process comes easily. The reality that transfer hearings are conducted in
such a way that "rubber-stamping" is standard, even in a single court, is
unacceptable and unjust. Accordingly, I propose the following change in
the Juvenile Justice Code, § 54.02(h):
If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it shall state specifically in
the order its reasons for waiver by providing a written description of
the individualized findings of the court as they relate to each of the
four factors enumerated in subsection (f) of this section. This written
order must be authored by the judge and the judge may not use any
preprinted form provided by either the court or the attorneys in the
case.
By specifically requiring judges to write their reasons for waiver of ex-
clusive jurisdiction, the judges presiding over the transfer hearings will be
compelled to give special attention to the waiver process, and give suffi-
224. An example of a transfer order can be found on the Juvenile Law Section of the
State Bar of Texas website. Transfer Order Form, STATE BAR OF TEXAS (2010), http://
www.juvenilelaw.org/Forms/Certification/04TransferOrder.pdf. The form contains blanks
for names and dates, as well as a list of the four statutory factors to be considered by the
judge during the transfer hearing. Id. The form contains no spaces for meaningful com-
ments by a judge. In the place of individualized findings, conclusory statements appear:
10. The Court considered the sophistication and maturity of the child and finds that
Respondent is sophisticated and mature under the Code.
11. The Court considered the record and previous history of the child and the pros-
pects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the
child by use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the juvenile
court and the Court finds that the procedures, services, and facilities currently availa-
ble to the juvenile court will not likely rehabilitate Respondent.
12. A full investigation and hearing of the child, his circumstances and the circum-
stances of the offenses was conducted by this Court and the Court finds that there is
probable cause to believe that the child committed the offenses as alleged.
13. The Court has considered the seriousness of the offenses and the background of
the child and finds that because of the seriousness of the offenses, the welfare of the
community requires that criminal proceedings proceed in criminal court concerning
the aforementioned felony offenses and all criminal conduct occurring in said criminal
episodes.
Id.
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cient consideration to whether the specific child before the judge is an
appropriate candidate for transfer to adult court.2 25
This reform is consistent with the Texas Legislature's intent in amend-
ing § 54.02(e) during the 2009 legislative session. 2 26 Senate Bill 518, in-
troduced by Senator Jerry Harris, requires defense attorneys and
prosecutors be given access to the juvenile's file, including written reports
to be considered by the judge during the hearing, at least five days prior
to the certification hearing.22 7 The Senate Committee's Bill Analysis
contains Senator Harris' statement of intent, which asserts the bill is in-
tended to help make the process of certification "as fair as possible." 2 28
The House Research Organization (HRO) bill analysis of Senate Bill 518
expanded on the intent of the bill, stating the bill is intended to help de-
crease the number of juveniles "who are certified for trial as adults, di-
verting them to juvenile facilities where they can receive rehabilitative
treatment, encounter less abuse, and become less likely to re-offend."22 9
Customarily, the HRO bill analyses contain both supporting and op-
posing arguments for each piece of legislation; notably, the HRO bill
analysis of Senate Bill 518 reflects that the bill had no opponents.23 0 in
fact, the bill passed unanimously in both houses. 2 31 The passage of this
bill indicates the Texas Legislature, in its most recent act to amend the
Juvenile Justice Code, supports limiting the number of minors who are
transferred to adult court.23 2 My proposal to amend § 54.02(h) to require
225. If the severity of the offense was the only factor the Texas Legislature wanted a
judge to consider, the other factors would not appear in the Code. Instead of one deter-
mining issue, the legislature has laid out four factors and has also allowed for "other mat-
ters" to be considered by the judge during the hearing.
226. Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S.
(2009) (outlining the rationale behind the proposed bill). The analysis acknowledges that
subsequent to the decrease in the age limit for persons incarcerated in the Texas Youth
Commission (TYC) from twenty-one years old to nineteen years old, prosecutors may pur-
sue a greater number of adult certifications for juveniles. Id. The bill sought to ensure that
the certification hearing was fair. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009)
(providing the background for the bill as well as supporting arguments).
230. Id.
231. H.J. of Tex., 81st Leg., R.S. 4095-96 (2009) (recording the passage of S.B. 518 in
the Texas House on May 20, 2009). The bill provides access to written documents concern-
ing the possible transfer of a juvenile to criminal court to the juvenile's attorney and the
prosecuting attorney at least five days before the discretionary transfer hearing. Id. at
4095. The bill passed with 140 Yeas, zero Nays and one member present, but not voting.
Id. The House sponsor of the bill was Rep. Jerry Madden. Id.; S.J. of Tex., 81st Leg., R.S.
844 (2009) (reflecting that S.B. 518 passed the Texas Senate unanimously on April 2, 2009).
Texas Senator Chris Harris authored and sponsored the bill. Id.
232. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009)
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written, individualized findings is a natural and necessary step to further
this goal.
Furthermore, the reasons listed in the HRO analysis reflect that the
Legislature understands why transfer hurts juveniles, and society at
large.23 3 The HRO bill analysis claims juveniles in adult jails or prisons
are "36 times more likely to commit suicide," face increased risk of as-
sault-including sexual assault-and a shocking 21% of inmate-on-in-
mate violent sexual attacks in 2005 were committed against juveniles.2 34
Moreover, the analysis points out that juveniles in the adult system are at
a higher risk for reoffending than those kept in the juvenile justice system
and tend to engage in more serious and violent offenses.2 35 Additionally,
the analysis links the benefits to the individual juvenile to the state at
large, explaining, "Texas would save money by preventing future incar-
ceration of these vulnerable youth."2 3 6
Finally, the HRO analysis notes that over 40% of misdemeanor offend-
ers who were sentenced to serve time in the Texas Youth Commission
detention facilities had mental health needs. 2 37 Likewise, over 40% of
felony and misdemeanor offenders were in need of substance abuse treat-
ment.2 3 8 The analysis concludes by acknowledging, "The services and
counseling these adolescents need desperately is either lacking or inade-
quate in adult detention centers." 2 3 9
The legislative history of Senate Bill 518 clearly demonstrates the legis-
lature recognizes the need to limit juvenile transfer. My proposal to re-
quire judges to write individual findings during transfer hearings is in line
with this important goal because it will enhance the fairness of the certifi-
cation process. Fewer juveniles will be transferred if judges are com-
pelled to do more than simply rubber-stamp the transfer order, and
juveniles will have greater chances of receiving the treatment and rehabil-
itation they need. Texas and its taxpayers will spend less money on future
incarceration, and the citizens of Texas will benefit from improved public
safety as a result of decreased recidivism among youth.
233. Id.
234. Id. In 2005, juveniles "comprised only one percent of the inmate population"
while falling victim to over one fifth of inmates imposed sexual violence. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
238. Id. The need for treatment instead of punishment is perhaps most obvious in
juveniles who exhibit problems with drugs and alcohol.
239. Id.
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C. The Need for an Immediate Right to Appeal a Transfer Hearing
The need for individualized, written findings during the certification
hearing is highlighted by the fact that Texas does not allow a juvenile to
file an interlocutory appeal after an unfavorable transfer hearing.24 0 No
appeal can be filed until after the conclusion of the criminal trial, mean-
ing the juvenile will be transferred to adult jail to await a criminal trial.2 41
Texas has not always prohibited immediate appeals of certification
hearings.2 42 But in an effort to "get tough" on juvenile crime, in 1995 the
74th Texas Legislature amended § 56.01, "Right to Appeal," by removing
the ability of a youth to immediately appeal a certification order. 2 43 The
legislative history of the acts of the 74th Legislature reveals the intent of
the change that disallowed immediate appeal was to crack down on juve-
nile crime.244 By contrast, the most recent act of the Texas Legislature
reveals the recognition among legislators that it is in the State's best in-
terest to decrease the number of juveniles transferred to adult court.2 45
Accordingly, I propose that an interlocutory appeal of a transfer hearing
be allowed by the Juvenile Justice Code, so a juvenile is not required to
wait until conviction in criminal court to appeal an objectionable transfer
decision. This can be accomplished by amending § 56.01, "Right to Ap-
peal," to include appeals of § 54.02 certification hearings.2 46
Returning to the statutory language in place prior to the 1995 changes
will make juvenile justice in Texas more fair and even-handed. Allowing
immediate appellate review will result in an overall increase in the effec-
tiveness of the justice system by serving as an important check on prose-
240. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.47(b) (West 2006) (outlining that an appeal from
a transfer hearing is only allowed in combination with the juvenile's appeal of a conviction
in criminal court).
241. Id.; 29 Thomas S. Morgan & Harold C. Gaither, Jr., Texas Practice: Juvenile Law
and Practice § 23:3 (3d ed. 2008) (noting that appeals in juvenile court are pursued as they
would be in civil cases, with the one exception of appeals for certification orders). An
appeal of an order from juvenile court that waives jurisdiction is not allowable in the Texas
civil system, and therefore must be combined with a criminal conviction appeal from an
order in adult court. 29 Thomas S. Morgan & Harold C. Gaither, Jr., Texas Practice: Juve-
nile Law and Practice § 23:3 (3d ed. 2008); Chris Vogel, For Their Own Good, HousTON
PRESS, May 28, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 10693190.
242. See Act approved May 31, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 262, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws
(current version at TEX. FAM. CoDE § 51.01) (West 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01
(West Supp. 2010); TEX. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 44.47 (West 2006).
243. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West Supp. 2010); Act approved May 31, 1995,
74th Leg., R.S., ch. 262, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws.
244. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 327, 74th Leg., R.S.
(1995) (describing the bill as an attempt to "address the surge in juvenile crime, ensure
meaningful consequences for juvenile offenders and help protect public safety").
245. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
246. TEX. FAM CoDE ANN. §§ 54.02, 56.01 (West Supp. 2010).
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cutors and judges who improperly view transfers merely as routine
formalities.247 Transfer from juvenile court to adult court should only oc-
cur in the most exceptional situations. The availability of an immediate
appeal of transfer decisions, combined with the requirement of individu-
alized findings for transfer hearings, will help reach the goal of limiting
juvenile transfer in Texas.
D. The Texas Youth Commission's Authority Must Extend to Youths
up to Age Twenty-one
Finally, Texas must reverse the age limitation imposed by Senate Bill
103, passed in response to the 2007 sex abuse scandal at the TYC.248 The
transfer rate in Texas has risen by 22% since 2007, as prosecutors seek
transfer in more cases. 2 49 Raising the age limit back to its previous level
of twenty-one years will decrease transfer rates.
Part of the rationale for lowering the age limit for TYC inmates was to
reduce the numbers of youth being committed to the TYC.2 5 0 While this
was a logical reaction to the problems the TYC had in 2007, the increased
transfer rates have harmed young offenders in Texas. Under the careful
watch of the Texas Legislature, the TYC has made significant changes in
its operations, and the agency continues to institute positive reforms.2 51
247. Chris Vogel, For Their Own Good, HousTON PRESS, May 28, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 10693190 (relating the experiences of a variety of attorneys who are uncom-
fortable with the rubber-stamping that occurs in some certification hearings).
248. Tex. S.B. 103, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007) (encompassing a large number of reforms
for the Texas Youth Commission, including a requirement that the age limit for youths held
at the TYC be lowered from twenty-one years of age to nineteen); TEX. Hum. RES. CODE
ANN. § 61.084(e) (West Supp. 2010).
249. Lisa Sandberg, More Juvenile Offenders Landing in Actual Prison, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEws, Feb. 23, 2009, at 13A, available at 2009 WLNR 3502417 (noting that trans-
fer rates in Texas have risen due to the lowered age limit of youths who can be committed
to TYC, according to juvenile justice advocates). Advocates assert that young offenders
are more amenable to rehabilitation and the harsher adult setting of adult prisons does not
meet their needs. Id. Bexar County juvenile prosecutor Jill Mata expressed that when
prosecutors don't believe they have sufficient time to work with a youth, they have no
alternative, and therefore they seek certification and transfer the youth. Id.
250. House Comm. on Corrections, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 103, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007)
(outlining the changes to the Human Resources Code that require the TYC to discharge
persons on their nineteenth birthday, rather than on their twenty-first birthday).
251. JAY KIMBROUGH, TEx. YOUTH COMM'N, REPORT FROM THE CONSERVATOR 5
(2007), http://www.tyc.state.tx.us/about/ConservatorReport.pdf (explaining some of the
immediate steps taken after Governor Perry's March 2, 2007 executive order directing a
full investigation into the sexual abuse scandal at the TYC); Alex Branch, Audit Cites
Texas Youth Commission Improvements, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 6, 2009, at
B2, available at 2009 WLNR 8554749 (noting that while the TYC still faces many problems,
the agency has improved in many areas, including the manner in which mistreatment alle-
gations are handled).
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Besides lowering the numbers of youth committed to TYC, the lowered
age limit was intended to allow the TYC to "focus on its core mission of
rehabilitating youths," separating them from the "older offenders who
are really adults."25 2 The latter concern was addressed at the time in Sen-
ate Bill 103, prohibiting placement of children younger than fifteen in a
dormitory housing youths aged seventeen or older,2 5 3 which the TYC has
implemented. 25 4 This is an example of the measures that can be taken to
ensure that older youth are not in a position to victimize younger children
and thus serves to demonstrate that older youth can be safely housed
with younger offenders. Accordingly, maintaining the age limitation at
age nineteen instead of twenty-one is not necessary to ensure the protec-
tion of younger offenders at the TYC because internal procedures could
successfully achieve this goal. Furthermore, the TYC has implemented a
policy prohibiting the placement of sexual offenders with non-sexual of-
fenders. 255 Notably, the sex scandal that prompted the 2007 statutory
changes involved adult employees at the TYC.256 Any worry about pro-
tecting younger inmates from older inmates appears to have been a sec-
ondary concern compared with the primary goal of reducing the numbers
of inmates at overtaxed TYC facilities.257
252. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 103, 80th Leg., R.S.
(2007). In light of the scientific research on brain development outlined in previous sec-
tions, particularly the finding that a person's brain is not fully developed until he or she
reaches twenty-five years of age, young offenders up to twenty-five years of age could
potentially benefit from the rehabilitative services offered in TYC detention facilities.
253. House Comm. on Corrections, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 103, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007)
(amending the Human Resource Code to disallow the practice of placing children younger
than fifteen in the same dormitory as youths seventeen years old or older, unless the
agency determines that doing so is essential to ensure a child's safety). The change does
not apply to short-term dormitory assignments. Id.
254. CHERYN TOWNSEND, TEXAS YOU-1I COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THIE PRO-
GRESS & IMPACE OF SENATE- BILL 103, 2 (2008), http://www.tyc.state.tx.us/reform/
SB103_FinalReport.pdf.
255. Lisa Sandberg, TYC Blasted for Lacking Safe Housing Policy, SAN ANTONIo Ex-
PRESs-NEWS, Jan. 1, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 529258 (describing policy changes at
TYC after allegations that four youths were sexually abused by peers in late 2008). In
December 2008, TYC director Cherie Townsend ordered that all sex offenders must be
segregated from other inmates. Id.
256. Nate Blakeslee, Hidden in Plain Sight, TEx. OBSIERVER, Feb. 23, 2007, at 6, avail-
able at 2007 WLNR 5413044 (discussing the facts surrounding the alleged sexual assault of
students in a Permian Basin correctional school). The assistant superintendent and princi-
pal were both accused of engaging in sexual relations with multiple students over a period
of time. Id. For a personal narrative from retired Inspector General Randal R. Chance on
the problems at the Texas Youth Commission, see RANDAi R. CIJANCI, RAPED Y TIE
STATF (1st Book Publishing 2004).
257. Compare House Comm. on Corrections, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 103, 80th Leg.,
R.S. (2007) (stating the purpose of the reduced age limit is to lower the number of youths
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Prosecutors evaluating serious juvenile cases will be less inclined to
seek transfer if the prosecutor knows the offending youth can be held by
the TYC until the age of twenty-one, instead of nineteen.25 8 Extending
the amount of time the juvenile justice system has to work with youth,
both treating and rehabilitating them, will benefit the youth of Texas and
the entire state population.2 5 9
Any one of the three reforms I propose would benefit the juveniles of
this state, the taxpayers, and Texas as a whole; the passage of all three
would make a significant difference in transfer rates and would help en-
sure that malleable minds are getting the necessary counseling and treat-
ment they need.
V. CONCLUSION
The founders of the juvenile justice system originally conceived the sys-
tem as society's best option for rehabilitating children who broke the
law.26 0 As juvenile courts spread across the nation, the uniform goal was
to determine the underlying causes of the child's behavior and provide
who are committed to the TYC), with House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex.
S.B. 103, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007) (stating that the reduced age limit would allow TYC to
"focus on its core mission of rehabilitating youths" and keep older and younger youths
separate).
258. Lisa Sandberg, More Juvenile Offenders Landing in Actual Prison, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 23, 2009, at 13A, available at 2009 WLNR 3502417 (identifying the
link between the increase in juvenile transfers and the change in Texas law that does not
allow the TYC to hold offenders who are over nineteen years of age). Bill Hawkins, a
former juvenile prosecutor in Harris County, acknowledges that a major factor in his deter-
mination of whether to seek transfer was the amount of time a juvenile could be held by
the TYC. Id. Hawkins stated, "When the window was shortened, certification became a
more viable option in some cases." Id.
259. Professor Stephanie Stevens, Supervising Attorney of the Criminal Justice Clinic
at St. Mary's University School of Law, agrees that Texas should change the age limit back
to twenty-one. She asserts:
Society is rarely benefited by allowing more children to be tried in criminal court and
treated like adults. The underlying concept of a separate juvenile system is that chil-
dren can and should be rehabilitated. Few people are rehabilitated in the adult prison
system, but the juvenile system still has a great deal to offer in the way of help for
child offenders.
E-mail from Stephanie Stevens, Supervising Attorney of the Criminal Justice Clinic, St.
Mary's School of Law, to author (May 18, 2010) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law
Review on Minority Issues).
260. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUS-
TICE 42, 42 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (outlining the beginnings of the
juvenile justice system in Chicago, Illinois).
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appropriate treatment so as to prevent future misbehavior.2 6 ' The discre-
tionary approach in juvenile courts, however, resulted in a relaxed view
of due process and rules of procedure.2 62 The "due process revolution,"
which began in the 1960s, forced the courts to examine how the U.S. Con-
stitution applied to children in the context of a juvenile proceeding.263
Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions extended to juveniles many consti-
tutional protections and due process rights enjoyed by adults, 2 64 but the
Court stopped short of equating juveniles and adults. 2 6 5 Most recently,
the Court in Roper v. Simmons stated three reasons why juveniles may
not be categorized as "among the worst offenders": (1) the absence of
maturity in youth and an underdeveloped understanding of the youth's
own responsibility for his or her actions; (2) the special vulnerability of
youth to negative influences, including peer pressure; and (3) the fact that
the character of a minor "is not as well formed as that of an adult." 2 6 6
The Court's reasoning informs the discussion of the blameworthiness of
youth, and the Roper holding should be considered to counsel against
placing juveniles into the harsher adult criminal justice system, even when
these juveniles commit severe crimes.
The use of transfer increased in the 1980s and the 1990s, when, in re-
sponse to increased juvenile crime, legislators, including those in Texas,
made it easier to transfer juveniles into adult criminal court.2 67 Across
the nation, the use of waiver of jurisdiction over a juvenile increased, and
transfer rates rose.268
The detrimental effects of imprisoning juveniles with adults soon be-
came clear. Studies reveal suicide rates for juveniles increase when they
are jailed with adults, as do risks of physical and sexual assault, compared
261. DAVID L. Myiizs, EXCLUDING VIOLENT You-is FROM JUVENILF COUIr: TilE
EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 14 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams Ill,
eds., 2001) (describing the theories behind the juvenile justice system).
262. Id. at 14-15 (explaining how an individualized approach to juvenile infractions
resulted in less rigid due process and procedure rules).
263. Id. at 15-16.
264. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966).
265. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (clarifying that while adults and minors share many of
the same constitutional rights, some rights are clearly distinguishable). An example illus-
trating this point is the bifurcated criminal court system which tries adults and juvenile
differently. Id.; McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
266. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-570; see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
267. Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:
A History and Critique, in THlE CHANGING BoiRDwEis OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 83, 86 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (providing an overview of the history of offense-
exclusion from juvenile court).
268. Id.
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to the rates of those in juvenile correctional facilities.2 6 9 Due to the
harmful effects of victimization, these juveniles in the adult system are
more likely to assault women and children once they are back out in soci-
ety.2 7 0 Furthermore, research shows recidivism is higher among juveniles
who are transferred to adult court, and the nature of those crimes is more
severe compared to the crimes of individuals who stayed within the juve-
271nile system.27 Correspondingly, when youth are incarnated with other
convicted criminals during critical stages of their identity development,
their sense of belonging and identity in relation to the rest of society is
severely warped. It becomes much more difficult for them to fit into
mainstream society when released. Finally, brain research provides com-
pelling evidence supporting the traditional belief that the young are less
culpable for their actions than are adults.27 2
For all of these reasons, Texas must reform state law to account for the
inappropriateness of juvenile transfer to adult court, and severely limit its
use. The three reforms I propose will help ensure that when juveniles are
transferred to stand trial in adult court, the process is fair and just.
First, individualized findings must be required to be written out by the
judge during the mandatory transfer hearing. Pre-printed forms with
check-boxes do not suffice for such a momentous decision in the life of a
juvenile. Judges must be required to write out individualized findings on
every child, explaining the reasons why transfer is appropriate. The most
recent actions of the Texas Legislature signify recognition of the dangers
269. MICHELE DEITCi ET AL., THE UNIV. oiF TEX. AT AUSTIN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON
Sci. OF PUB. AFFAIRs, FROM TIME Our To HARD TIM!': YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE
Aruiir CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM xiv (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/
From %20Time%200ut%20to%2OHard %20Time-revised%20final.pdf.
270. RANDALL G. SHELDEN, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENIHE JUSTIcE IN AMERICAN
SoCIETY 344 (2006).
271. Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult
Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 183-84
(2007) (citing two independent studies conducted in Florida and Michigan finding that the
transfer of juveniles to adult facilities resulted in an increase in violence and frequency of
crimes); Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delin-
quency? JUVENILE JUSTICE BULL ETIN, Aug. 2008, at 7-8, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
272. See Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, The American Bar Association's Youth at
Risk Initiative: Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in Delinquency Cases: Creating a
Paradigm for Specialized Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM. CTr. REv 466, 473-74; Eliza-
beth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 816-17 (2003);
MICHELE DITr-1CH ET AL., THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, LYNDON B. JoIINSON ScIl. OF
PUB. AFFAIRs, FROM TIME OuT To HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN TIE ADuLT CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/From%20Time
%200ut%20to%2OHard%2OTime-revised%20final.pdf.
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of adult prison for juveniles.2 73 Requiring written individualized findings
will further the stated goal of the Texas Legislature to make the juvenile
transfer process as fair as possible.
Secondly, a juvenile must be able to file an interlocutory appeal imme-
diately after a transfer hearing, before a criminal conviction. While this
appeal is pending, the juveniles must be allowed to remain in juvenile
detention facilities, and not transferred to adult jail, where they will likely
be kept in solitary confinement for their own protection. To make a juve-
nile wait until a criminal conviction before appealing an objectionable
transfer hearing is simply unconscionable, especially when that juvenile
may properly belong in juvenile court. Section 56.01 of the Juvenile Jus-
tice Code must be amended to allow for immediate appeal after a certifi-
cation hearing.
Finally, the TYC must have the authority to hold a juvenile until he or
she turns twenty-one years old. Prosecutors who are unwilling to have
juveniles locked away for only a few years now request transfer at higher
rates, and unfortunately, for many prosecutors and judges, the mandatory
judicial transfer hearing has become routine.2 74 Since the dramatic in-
creases in transfer rates occurred only after the age was lowered, there is
good reason to believe the rates will taper off if the age limit is changed
back to its prior limit of twenty-one years. Increasing the amount of time
the juvenile justice system has to work with youth, both treating and re-
habilitating, will benefit the youth of Texas and the entire state
population.
More faith must be put into the Texas Youth Commission and its ability
to rehabilitate youth. The Capital Offender Program (COP), as one of
the most successful programs in the country, shows enormous promise.2 75
The Texas legislature must continue to focus on enhancing the rehabilita-
tive services offered by the TYC, and direct resources toward helping
youth, rather than waiting to spend those resources on juveniles who re-
offend after they have been confined with adults. Transferring youth who
commit crimes to the adult system is the same as telling those youth that
273. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 518, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
274. Chris Vogel, For Their Own Good, HoUsYrON PREss, May 28, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 10693190.
275. MICHIEuE DEITCH ET AL., TiE UNIV. oF TEX. AT AusTIN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON
SciA. oF Pun. AFFAIRS, FROM TIME OUT -1o HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE
ADui T CRIMINAL JusTICE SYSTEM 66 (2009), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/newslimages/filel
From %20Time%200ut%20to%2OHard%2OTime-revised%20final.pdf (citing a recent
COP study "show[ing] an overall 55% reduction in re-incarceration for any offense and
43% reduction in re-incarceration for felonies"). Three years after release from the pro-
gram, only 15.2% of youths reoffend; as compared to 35.6% of young capital offenders
who do not attend such a program. Id.
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society has given up on them, that they are unsalvageable, and that they
are not ever expected to be positive and productive members of society.
Sending kids into adult prisons is the antithesis of the principles the juve-
nile justice system was founded upon. Texas law must be reformed to
provide treatment, education, and rehabilitation to youth who commit
crimes, thus fulfilling the promise of juvenile justice.

